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ABSTRACT
TOWARDS MANAGING AND UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF
UNDERWATER TERRORISM
Richard J. Gay
Old Dominion University, 2012
Director: Dr. Patrick Hester

This dissertation proposes a methodology to manage and understand the risk of
underwater terrorism to critical infrastructures utilizing the parameters of the risk
equation. Current methods frequently rely on statistical methods, which suffer from a
lack of appropriate historical data to produce distributions and do not integrate epistemic
uncertainty. Other methods rely on locating subject matter experts who can provide
judgment and then undertaking an associated validation of these judgments.
Using experimentation, data from unclassified successful, or near successful, underwater
attacks are analyzed and instantiated as a network graph with the key characteristics of
the risk of terrorism represented as nodes and the relationship between the key
characteristics forming the edges. The values of the key characteristics, instantiated as
the length of the edges, are defaulted to absolute uncertainty, the state where there is no
information for, or against, a particular causal factor. To facilitate obtaining the value of
the nodes, the Malice spectrum is formally defined which provides a dimensionless,
methodology independent model to determine the value of any given parameter. The
methodology produces a meta-model constructed from the relationships between the
parameters of the risk equation, which determines a relative risk value.

This dissertation is dedicated to my God,
"who trains my hands for war, and my fingers for battle"
Psalm 144:1 (Revised Standard Version)
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NOMENCLATURE
A

Activity (of an attacker)

AIChE

American Institute of Chemical Engineers

ASG

Abu Sayyaf Group

C

Consequence (of an attack)

Ca

Capability (of an attacker)

CCPS

Center for Chemical Process Safety

CI

Critical infrastructure

COBP

Code of Best Practices

COBPE

Code of Best Practices for Experimentation

DHS

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DOE

U.S. Department of Energy

EPRI

Electric Power Research Institute

I

Intent (of an attacker)

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

JI

Jemaah Islamiyah

LTTE

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam

MSRAM

Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model

n

Sample size (for statistical analysis)

NEI

Nuclear Energy Institute

NRC

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLF

Palestine Liberation Front

R

Risk (of an attack)

T

Threat (of an attack)

V

Vulnerability (of an attack)

VAM-CF

Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for Chemical Facilities
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Problem statement

The threat of terrorism remains a global concern (Cobain & Karim, 2011; DefenceWire,
2008; Fuard & Kamalendran, 2006; Gendar, Alpert & Parascandola, 2010) that
challenges risk managers, in both the government and private sectors, to manage and
understand the nature of the risk to minimize the expense of mitigation while holistically
addressing the underlying issues. The existing methods of risk analysis for terrorism
have inherent weaknesses primarily derived from the emphasis on statistical processes or
expert opinion. A terrorist organization conducts extensive planning and is reactive to a
defender's actions; therefore the nature of the threat is not random but deterministic
(Darby, 2006) and using a stochastic process to model the system is contraindicated.
This is exasperated in the underwater domain by the minimal number of attacks, on
targets with great diversity, which hamper the ability to create accurate probability
distributions (Jenelius, Petersen & Mattson, 2006). In many instances, the application of
statistics is prone to the assumption that the probability of attack is, by default, absolutely
certain (i.e.: p(attack) = 1.0) (Apostolakis, & Lemon, 2005; Brown, Carlyle, Salmeron, &
Wood, 2005; Johnson, Khater, & Kuzak, 2005; Levitin, & Ben-Haim, 2008) a false
assumption given the large quantity of critical infrastructure and the extremely low
number of attackers. Applicable to any method employed to determine risk is the
introduction of bias and errors when quantifying qualitative values (Meehl, 1978; Rao,
Kushwaha, Verma, & Srividya, 2007).

Another concern is that the assumption is

occasionally made that the attack scenario is ergodic. Given the various rationalities of
the adversarial organizations involved, their intentions and their capabilities, this
assumption is incorrect (Jenelius, Petersen & Mattson, 2006; Macgill & Siu, 2005).
Finally, in some risk evaluation methodologies a homogenous viewpoint is employed
which constrains the risk equation as a convolution of two or three elements, principally
threat, consequence and vulnerability at the end of the solution of the risk equation,
ignoring the dependent nature of the three elements (Jenelius, Petersen, & Mattson, 2006;
Daneshkhah, 2004; Kaplan, 2002).
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1.2

Research objective

The objective of this research is to improve the ability to manage and understand the risk
of underwater terrorism by creating a model based on the relationships of the elements in
the risk equation. This research inductively examined available data to develop and
analyze a list of parameters and relationships, which was used to deductively create a
multi-perspective model of the risk equation. This research provides an improved
understanding of the intent, capability and actions of adversaries, which may assist in
identifying options to defeat them.

Haimes (2004) summarized the benefit of this

undertaking when he noted that policy involving risks is readily accepted when based on
firm scientific foundations and steeped in credible scientific or technological information.
Answering four research questions about the nature of the relationships between the
adversary and the defender supported achieving the research objective.
1.3

Research questions

The nature of the risk of an underwater terrorist attack can be examined as related
parameters with specific values (Gay & Hester, 2010). The following four research
questions, derived from the precepts of developing a model from the Code of Best
Practices for Experimentation (Alberts & Hayes, 2005), hereafter called the COBPE,
mapped a path to holistically create a model of the underwater terrorism related
parameters.
1.3.1 Research Question One: What are the parameters of an underwater terrorism
incident?
As a starting point for the analysis of the parameters pertinent to this research, a list of the
applicable parameters must be developed. The initial research, based on analysis of
archived information available in government and other trusted databases; interviews
with current practitioners of underwater defense and their Red Teams (opposing forces in
simulated underwater attack exercises); and review of factors currently utilized in other
terrorism incidents (e.g., surface, aircraft/airport, etc.), will develop a list of the pertinent
parameters to be studied. This list, comprised of dependent and independent variables,
will be ranked by relevance, based on the number of times the parameters were either
available or considered, and their connection to other factors currently employed in risk
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analysis. The dimensions of the parameters (e.g., unit of measure, range of values, time
when known) will also be examined.
1.3.2 Research Question Two: What are the relationships between the identified
parameters?
An understanding of the relationship between the parameters is necessary to truly
understand the nature of the problem - and its solution space. In any complex adaptive
system, such as a terrorism incident, relationships may indicate causality, including
direction of causality (e.g., A—*B and B—>A). Additional questions, similar to those in
research question one include appropriate units of measure and range of values. By
mapping the relationships between the various parameters, an understanding of their
impact and dependencies will be advanced.
1.3.3

Research Question Three: What is the appropriate method to quantify the
qualitative variables pertinent to an underwater terrorism threat incident?

The values of many of the parameters are qualitative in nature (e.g., the intention of an
adversary). To facilitate modeling, every parameter must be enumerable; basically the
set of the possible elements for the parameter must be countable. Pending analysis of the
parameters and relations, quantification may be achieved through several methods (e.g.,
fuzzy logic, matrix ranking, focus groups) that will ensure transparency and validity of
the model.
1.3.4 Research Question Four: What is the measure of risk?
The objective of the research is to manage and understand the risk of an underwater
terrorism incident. To better understand the magnitude of any scenario each scenario
analyzed must have a final value, of one format or another (numerical, alphanumerical,
etc.), potentially with a unit of measure, in order to compare the relative risk between
them. The final value must have meaning to both the analyst and the policy maker,
although meaning may be relative within the solution space and only applicable to the
scenarios evaluated vice the total population space.
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1.4

Research significance

The importance of ports and waterways cannot be overstated since 1/3 of world's
economy and 1/4 of the United States' economy relies on international commerce &
trade, most of which is transported over the oceans (Abt, 2003).

This dependency

illustrates the importance of transportation for moving people to and from places of
employment, and cargo, including food, fuel and just-in-time production materials from
producer to consumer. Ports and waterways are "a key interest from the point of view of
transport systems users" (Jenelius, Petersen & Mattson, 2006, p. 538). As Zimmerman
notes: "...infrastructure occupies a central position in the U.S. Economy (contributing
about 10% of GDP). Small local terrorism attacks can have large regional and national
economic impacts" (2005, p. 5). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been
criticized in the media for spending "hundreds of millions of dollars to protect ports since
Sept. 11 without sufficiently focusing on those that are most vulnerable, a policy that
could compromise the nation's ability to better defend against terrorist attacks" (Lipton,
2005, p. 1). Security measures must strike an appropriate balance between security and
freedom to ensure rapid transit for perishable and seasonal goods (Saito, Guthmuller &
DeWeert, 2005). Utilizing a method to manage and understand uncertainty of the risk of
a terrorist attack may assist a decision-maker in improving security for critical
infrastructure.
The research provides three significant contributions to risk analysis in the underwater
domain. First, it contributes to the body of knowledge by identifying and relating (i.e.,
mapping) the critical variables pertinent to the risk analysis for underwater terrorism.
Second, this research expands the methodologies for the analysis of underwater terrorism
risk. Finally, this research provides areas for future research in the critical path for
managing and understanding uncertainty when evaluating the risk of an underwater
terrorism attack.
1.5

Key assumptions, limitations and delimitations

1.5.1

Assumptions

This research assumed that:
• the relationship between the risk parameters are linear,
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• the parameters demonstrated in an underwater attack conducted by the
government were similar to those employed by an adversarial organization,
• the current processes employed by the intelligence community would provide
adequate vocabulary for the research,
• the Adversary/Defender model is an open system relationship containing "more
variables than we can comprehend at one time, or that some of the variables are
subject to influences that we cannot control or predict" (Thompson, 2006, p. 6),
• adversarial organizations use similar methods to recruit and train people
regardless of the tactics, techniques or procedures employed,
• an adversary operates under less restrictive norms of rationality than the defender,
• an adversary is motivated by a consequence,
• an adversary searches for vulnerability to achieve the desired consequence,
•

if a vulnerability is exploited, it will reasonably incur a consequence, and

• the infrastructure under study is, in fact, critical.
1.5.2 Limitations
The interdependencies between the variables of the risk equation cannot be ignored.
However, this research focused on the threat variable from the risk equation, as defined in
Section 2.2.1, to reduce the scope of the research. This research did not consider how
either vulnerability or consequence was determined. It did employ a multi-perspective
view of the relationships between vulnerability and consequence with the threat element
of the risk equation.
The model testing, one aspect of confirming validity was fashioned in a less restrictive
form "so that it covers a broader range of phenomena and is exposed to more
opportunities for falsification" (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994, p. 22). However, to
achieve significant internal validity, the model testing had a high degree of control,
which, unfortunately, reduced the naturalistic conditions, thereby reducing the external
validity (Cook & Campbell, 1983).

A balance, based on the data population, was

maintained in both developing and testing the models.
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1.5.3 Delimitations
To minimize the scope of the research, and provide a focus on analysis of the risk
equation, this research did not:
• explore how to measure vulnerabilities of attacked critical infrastructures, except
as required for the interdependencies of the risk equation,
• explore how to measure the consequence of a successful attack on critical
infrastructure except as required for the interdependencies of the risk equation,
and will be limited by considering only the external adversary.
Runkel and McGrath (1972) identified three aspects that must be addressed when
considering if research is generalizable. First, can the research methodology produce the
same results under different conditions? Section 0 explains the process employed for the
selection and analysis of the data. This methodology is generic in nature, fostering
generalizability for any man-made threat and facilitating other researchers to change the
research environment and observe variability, ensuring this research "covers a broader
range of phenomena and is exposed to more opportunities for falsification" (King,
Keohane & Verba, 1994, p. 22).
Second, Runkel and McGrath (1972) ask if the research design focused on measurement
and not process. This research did not take the initial measurements but used and
converted (qualitative to quantitative) existing data. The conversion of the data was
conducted in the analysis of the cases and used the Malice spectrum outlined in Section 0.
The conversion retained the context of the original data to enable exploration, specifically
for research question four, what is the measure of risk, of possible alternative
explanations that may exist for the causal relationships observed (Huitt, 1998).
Runkel and McGrath's (1972) third aspect is the composition of the sample for the data
analysis. Sample size, n, is vital in determining the confidence interval and confidence
coefficient of statistical models and impacted the depth of the analysis (Mendenhall &
Sincich, 1995). A larger n provides confidence for the inferences that are made from the
data. However, n was limited by the availability of unclassified data and the expectation
of utilizing two samples for the research - one as hypothesis testing and one sample for
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methodology testing. The total sample size was n=51, but it was disaggregated into two
samples, n=26 for Sample A and n=25 for Sample B. Sample A was larger because the
statistical power desired was n=0.80 and the expected difference between the means of
0.8 required a sample size of at least n=26. The composition of the two samples was
dictated by the data sources and the methodology. Data were collected but not sorted.
Once the total sample was documented, the sample was parsed into two samples and then
sorted - to wit, the samples were generated randomly.
The research was conducted from the perspective of the United States as the defender
entity. The perspective of the research includes, but is not limited to, aspects such as
resource allocation, rationality, scope and magnitude of the problem set, and the form of
government. The research examines adversarial actions across numerous geographic
areas, differing governments and over the 60 year time period that minimizes the impact
of the research's perspective on generalizability.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
An exploration of critical infrastructure protection from underwater (formally termed
subsurface) attack begins with understanding the relationship between critical
infrastructure and risk. A large part of the concept of risk is uncertainty, which will be
explored later in this chapter. Parsing the problem further, there is uncertainty in the risk
of maritime terrorism, more specifically, an underwater attack to critical infrastructure.
An attack conducted underwater is a unique instance of terrorism with unique challenges
including the environment, tactics used, techniques employed and the specialized
equipment required. Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of the alignment of these
concepts and forms the basis for this review, illustrating the narrowing of focus from the
generalized concerns of risk to specialized issues involved with the uncertainty in the
analysis of a terrorist attack in the underwater environment. The following sections
discuss each topic depicted in Figure 1, proceeding from the general to the specific.

Critical
Infrastructure

Uncertainty
Maritime
Terrorism
Underwater
Attack i

Figure 1: Path of the literature review
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The context of this research is managing and understanding the risk of terrorism against
critical infrastructure.

Most definitions of critical infrastructure (CI) have common

variables that point to physical structures that are absolutely necessary for the
development and functioning of a society. The intent and spirit of much of the current
literature are captured by four definitions: one is provided by the International Journal
for Critical Infrastructures that defines critical infrastructures as: "...networks for the
provision of telecommunication and information services, energy services (electrical
power, natural gas, oil and heat), water supply, transportation of people and goods
banking and financial services, government services and emergency services" (2004, p.
np). This definition incorporates the variables of the basic services (e.g. water, sewer) for
society, information and communication services for economic development and the
systems that provides for basic government support.
In the second definition, Moteff, Copeland and Fischer (2003) provide a more
generalized definition in their report to Congress, which states that critical infrastructures
are "infrastructures so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a
debilitating impact on defense or economic security" (p. 2). Although this definition
includes infrastructure, it leaves the reader with an unclear explanation of the scope of the
infrastructure under debate. Is it physical properties, data and information or perhaps
other ethereal variables?

It does make an interesting distinction that loss of the

infrastructure would have an impact on defense, an element only implied in the Journal's
definition previously provided.
In both cases, the reader is left to debate the level of impact required to categorize a
system as critical vice non-critical. Further, where do environmental consequences fall
within the definition? Is loss of public confidence a factor when debating loss of
government services or impacting defense or economic security?
The United States government has several key documents that provide an additional
definition of critical infrastructure. Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), Critical
Infrastructure Protection, defines critical infrastructure as variables of the national
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infrastructure that are "essential to the minimum operations" (Clinton, 1998, p. 1) for the
national and economic security of the United States. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
clarified the definition and included virtual systems. It defines critical infrastructures as
systems that are "so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic
security, national public health or safety" (Critical Infrastructures Protection, 2001, p.
401). The United States' military broadens the definition to include political, military,
economic, social, infrastructure! and informational (PMESII) elements in a system-ofsystems approach to understanding the entire environment (SRI International, 2007).
The definition of critical infrastructure is subjective because it must be scalable, and it
depends on the context of the problem being analyzed. Therefore, for this research,
critical infrastructure contains the following critical variables: physical structures and not
the data or information contained within those structures; these structures must be
absolutely necessary for the defense, the society or the economic security of the
community served; and loss of the physical infrastructure would have a detrimental effect
on the public confidence. Using these variables, the following definition is proposed for
this research:
Definition 1: Critical infrastructures are those facilities and their associated components
that would cause considerable degradation of political, military, economic, social,
infrastructural or informational services, or have a detrimental effect on the
environment, in the event of a successful adversarial event.
This definition includes chemical production plants or storage facilities, electric power
generation or distribution facilities, transportation nodes or hazardous material nodes
such as nuclear power plants or nuclear storage facilities.
This definition contains an ambiguity which can be clarified within the context of the
facilities discussed - "considerable degradation".

To understand what considerable

degradation is, the reader should include appropriate metrics within the context of the
conversation.

Johnson, Khater and Kuzak (2005) suggest metrics for critical

infrastructure include public health and safety such as regulatory requirements, financial
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impacts to society and corporations such as business interruptions, loss of public
confidence, and environmental consequences.
This definition also remains scalable, capable of being applied internationally, nationally
or within a particular community. Scalability remains a vital variable of understanding
critical infrastructure. From the perspective of a town planner, the water or electric
delivery systems are part of the town's critical infrastructure. However, at the national
level, that town's infrastructure may not be considered critical when compared to other
facilities such as a transnational oil or gas pipelines or the telecommunications facilities
that comprise the Global Information Grid. This research does not debate the merits of
either scenario but develops a methodology for managing and understanding uncertainty
regardless of how the analyst defines the scope of critical infrastructure.
2.1.

Uncertainty

Uncertainty in the risk evaluation environment is a fundamental attribute that is, in a
sense, the underlying cause for risk assessment, effectively bounded rationality - decision
making without perfect information. Decision Makers distinguish "among three types of
uncertainty: inadequate understanding, incomplete information, and undifferentiated
alternatives" (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997, p. 149). Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) document at
least 14 different ways that uncertainty is conceptualized including risk, ambiguity or
conflict. They propose that "uncertainty in the context of action is a sense of doubt that
blocks or delays action" (p. 150). Ayyub (2005), who developed an ignorance hierarchy,
utilized a definition that starts with "reality is perceived as a continuum in its composition
of objects, concepts and propositions" and builds through knowledge to uncertainty (p.
15).
Other authors approach uncertainty along various stages of an analysis process. For
example, Argote (1982) provides a short summary for the beginning of the analysis
process when she writes the "concept of [input uncertainty] draws on the work done in
the areas of cybernetics and information theory (e.g., Wiener, 1948; Shannon and
Weaver, 1949; Miller, 1953; Attneave, 1959) in which uncertainty is expressed as a
function of the number of choices or alternatives in a given situation" (p. 422).
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Many authors focus on mainly the process of the analysis and its applicable variables,
only mentioning uncertainty as an afterthought. However, Macgill and Siu (2005) argue
that "knowledge is limited and approximate. In the risk context, this argues for open
consideration to be given to uncertainty and in particular how it is dealt with by the
various constituencies involved with a risk issue" (p. 1107). They emphasize that
certitude, a state of certainty, is a perception or degree of confidence a person has in
his/her acquisition of true and valid knowledge, including a magnitude of scientific
certainty. The Code of Best Practice for C2 Assessment (COBP) defines uncertainty as
"an inability to determine a variable value or system state (nature) or to predict its future
evolution" (NATO, 2002, p. 249). The COBP makes an important point that when all the
possible outcomes are known, including their associated probabilities, but the outcome of
a specific instance is not known, then "there is a risk, in this case a known risk,
associated with a particular outcome" (NATO, 2002, p. 249). For this research, the
definition of uncertainty will assume a more systems based approach:
Definition 2: Uncertainty is the lack of precise knowledge about a system or a given
situation.
2.1.1. Types of uncertainty
The different types of uncertainty have been parsed in multiple ways (e.g., Ayyub, 2005;
Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; Willis et al., 2005). This research will utilize the hierarchy,
recreated in Figure 2, developed by Haimes (2004). It suggests that uncertainty can be
broken down into variability and knowledge. It further parses variability into temporal,
spatial and individual heterogeneity.

Knowledge uncertainty is parsed into model,

parameter and decision. The taxonomy appears to align with other taxonomies described
in the literature, either directly or through interpretation by the reader.

A closer

examination of the types of uncertainty follows.
2.1.1.1.

Variability

The aleatory uncertainty, labeled variability by Haimes (2004), is about the state of
reality and about our knowledge of the state reality. Aleatory uncertainty is frequently
used in a natural sense (e.g., earthquakes or points of landfalls for hurricanes) or in a
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generic sense like the states of nature that can concern the actions of others (NATO,
2002; Darby, 2006; Woo, 1999). Haimes (2004) clarifies variability when he states
"variability occurs when the quantity of concern is not a specific value but rather a
population of values" (p. 238).

Variability includes the concept of ambiguity or

"uncertainty associated with the likelihood of an event" (Darby, 2006, p. 135).

UNCERTAINTY

Variability
Knowledge

Temporal

Individual
Heterogeneity

Spatial

Model

Parameter

Decision

Figure 2: Sources of uncertainty (adapted from Haimes, 2004)

The sub-elements of variability are complimentary but independent. Temporal variability
is variability based on the dimension of time. It can be modified by spatial variability
which is based on location, specifically geographic location (the reader can consider the
case of a hurricane making landfall. The when and where of landfall is a variable that is
constricted as the landfall event nears). The final variability factor that was described by
Haimes (2004) and included in this research's taxonomy is individual heterogeneity.
Similar to Haimes' (2004) application, this research views individual heterogeneity as
differences between individual groups (e.g., A1 Qaeda, HAMAS, Gama'a al-Islamiyya)
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vice individual people and, which is a vital factor when representing populations for
making assumptions about uncertainty.
2.1.1.2.

Knowledge

In addition to the uncertainty manifest in reality, there is epistemic uncertainty, which is
distinguished by decision makers as "inadequate understanding, incomplete information
or undifferentiated alternatives" (Lipshitz & Straus, 1997, p. 149). This category of
uncertainty, classified as knowledge uncertainty (Haimes, 2004) addresses uncertainty in,
or caused by, our model, our parameters and our decision process and is discussed in
subsequent paragraphs in this section.

Knowledge uncertainty, frequently called

epistemic uncertainty, is introduced by humans into the understanding of the event and is
solely concerned with our understanding and interpretation of reality (Darby, 2006; Kelly
& Smith, 2009). Knowledge uncertainty is related to non-specificity, which cannot be
represented by a probability (Darby, 2006). The importance of understanding knowledge
uncertainty is highlighted by Woo (2002) when he states: "Whatever the underlying
theoretical foundation, given the dependence on the modus operandi of a terrorist
organization, any risk calculation inevitably involves a number of subjective probability
assignments, variability of which amplifies the epistemic uncertainty" (p. 16).
Humans tend to order the concept of reality into a subconscious structure based on beliefs
and feedback loops, commonly referred to as our model. Ordering allows humans to
evaluate or manipulate data and to translate real-world observables into information
(Kelly & Smith, 2009). The COBP (2002) uses model-based uncertainty and uncertainty
of focus to encompass model uncertainty. Model-based uncertainty endeavors to answer
if the underlying model is valid and representative of reality. Uncertainty of focus asks if
the "assessment covers all the important factors and/or issues" (NATO, 2002, p. 254).
Yu and Harris (2009) identify two types of input variables: regressive variables and
model parameters. "Regressive variables are those that can be influenced by process
design or by a control strategy.

With model parameters, there are typically no

opportunities to directly influence their variability" (p. 596). Regressive variables are a
function of model-based uncertainty and may be caused or exacerbated by the
assumptions that engineers or risk analysts invoke (NATO, 2002).
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As noted in the previous paragraph, another category of uncertainty is within the
parameters of the model created or our understanding of the model parameters and
includes imprecision in measurement, censoring or interpretive errors (Haimes, 2004;
Kelly & Smith, 2009; Macgill & Siu, 2005). Once a parameter is selected and coded into
the model, there are usually limited opportunities to improve the parameter's
inconsistency.
uncertainty and

The COBP (2002) calls this type of uncertainty parameter value
introduces the "complexity

of uncertain factors (i.e., their

dimensionality)—when a sufficiently complex factor (e.g., scenarios or future
technology) is uncertain, the team cannot expect to overview the set of all possible true
states" (pp. 254-255). Reducing input uncertainty by expressing uncertainty as a function
of the number of alternatives has a long history of research in cybernetics and
information theory (e.g., Attneave, 1959; Miller, 1953; Shannon & Weaver, 1949;
Wiener, 1948). In addition to the uncertainty within the parameter, there exists an
"information theory [that suggests], as volume homogeneity increases, input uncertainty
increases" (Argote, 1982, p. 426).
Related to parameter uncertainty is the concept of vagueness. Vagueness is a situation
where there is uncertainty how to develop the parameter to describe a value within an
event. Vagueness is not usually represented by a probability function. Darby (2006) uses
an example of a report that is in a box and the box is located in a room. We are certain
that the report is in a specific box, and we know exactly where that box is located in the
room. However, when asked if the box is in the center of the room there may be several
answers: The first answer may be "no" if the box is located in a corner or touching a wall
(value = 0). The second answer may be "yes" if the box is directly in the center of the
room (value = 1). However, the third answer could be "maybe" if there is some doubt as
to the actual center of the room (value 0 < x > 1) (Darby, 2006, pp. 23-25). Darby (2006)
asserts that fuzzy sets address vagueness and differ from crisp sets because they include
the concept of partial membership.
The third category of uncertainty related to the interpretation of reality is decision
uncertainty that "surrounds the implementation of analytical results into actual decisions
and policy" (Haimes, 2004, p. 250) or, as an output of the analytical process, may result
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in "undifferentiated alternatives" (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997, p. 149).

Decision

uncertainty is post-analysis and will not be examined in this research.
2.1.1.3.

Sources of uncertainty

One source of uncertainty in risk analysis of terrorist attacks is the variability and error in
the estimate of threat. The existing foundations for information regarding the parameters
that determine what the current terrorist threat is are intelligence estimates, historical
analysis, and expert judgment, which are not deterministic in nature and force the model
to use approximations to quantify them (Willis, et al., 2005). As an example, using
estimates from historical analysis is very difficult since it is very rare for the
circumstances surrounding an event to remain the same at all times and the causal
connections are not usually fully understood (Jenelius, et al., 2006).
The second source of uncertainty is how the value of consequence is determined.
Because of uncertainty, policy analysis may rely on heuristic estimates that may have a
low probability of being correct (or, the reciprocal: a high probability of being incorrect).
The estimates may provide a concrete estimate of risk but it is not linked to the risk
reality (Willis, et al., 2005). Methods for planning under uncertainty currently exist (see
Bauer, 2002; Davis, 1994; Lempert, Popper & Bankes, 2003) and can assist with
determining risk.
In the previous discussion of risk and uncertainty there is a common thread pertinent to
the research questions and eloquently argued by Darby (2006): "A terrorist attack is not a
random event; it involves a specific scenario that is selected, planned, and implemented
by the adversary" (p. 9). Since the terrorist attack is not a random event there are
difficulties in developing a quantitative risk matrix due to the uncertainties involved
(Jones, Lyford, Qazi, Solan, & Haimes, 2003). Therefore the use of random modeling
and methods of risk analysis based on randomness is flawed. Darby (2006) continues
that "terrorist acts are intentional and an evaluation of them involves considerable
epistemic uncertainty. Traditional probabilistic risk analysis techniques have difficulty
modeling the risk from terrorist's acts due to the inherently large epistemic uncertainty"

17

(p. 12). Scenarios involving large epistemic uncertainty in the analysis of threat form the
keystone for this research.
2.1.2. Uncertainty and reality
If humans were capable of perfect knowledge, then our perception of the world would be
equivalent to reality. However, reality is fluid and humans have yet to acquire perfect
knowledge, which introduces uncertainty. Figure 3 is an illustration of how an aspect of
reality can develop an error cone based on our description of that reality, or our
parameters. Furthermore, our working portrayal of reality, essentially our model (either
physical, virtual or mental) develops its own potential cone of error.

These cones

represent the various types of uncertainty that will be discussed in the next few sections
and are illustrative of how uncertainty is derived or manifest from reality.

REALITY

Figure 3: Planes of uncertainty
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2.1.3. Dependence
Frequently, uncertainty is driven, or increased by, dependence because of the relationship
between the entities or states that can increase the breadth of the fault tree dramatically,
and is context-sensitive for each specific scenario. Dependence is context-sensitive and
becomes more complicated for specific threats than for random threats. Consider the
impact of copycat attacks seen in domestic and international terrorism or the increase in
attack frequency around holy days in the Middle East. Consider too, the dependencies
which affect vulnerability, for example, Zimmerman (2005) discusses the 1998 water
main break in New York city, which caused a street to collapse and a gas line to rupture.
When addressing threat, the analyst or modeler must account for dependence. Darby
2006) incorporates dependence by using a multi-perspective model (Adversary/
Defender) and stresses that dependence is far more complicated for terrorist acts than for
random acts (e.g. earthquake or equipment failure) because if one attack scenario is
attempted and succeeds in causing a significant consequence then the frequency of the
attacks may increase as success encourages more attacks (e.g., road side improvised
explosive devices, or IEDs). The frequency of attacks can also increase based on world
events as terrorist groups obtain more recruits based on actual or perceived injustices by
the United States.
2.2.

Risk

Generically, risk is the probability of the occurrence of a specific possible event and is
frequently associated with negative outcomes such as the possibility of suffering harm or
loss (NATO, 2002) but may also include the possibility of not achieving the objective; an
assessment of the probability of failure; an uncertain future scenario; or a perception of
consequential pain (NATO, 2002 pp. E-l, E-2). A specific definition of risk has not yet
been accepted across disciplines, as noted by Macgill and Siu (2005) who identified 26
different technical and social definitions of risk, but the concept has evolved to the point
of general understanding when discussed among practitioners of risk management.
Pertinent to this research, Willis, et al. (2005) assert that "there is not a consistent and
shared definition of terrorism risk" (p. vii). They further insist that there is "no existing
framework for selecting and combining risk indicators" and lament that the methods for
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testing the accuracy and the probability distribution of risk has received little attention (p.
vii). An examination of risk definitions reveals a commonality that highlights the core
concept of risk; essentially that risk has inherent consequences; and that "risk is an
intrinsically dynamic and unstable phenomenon" (Macgill & Siu, 2005, p 1119).
At perhaps the most generic level, risk is defined as "...the uncertainty of outcomes [and]
it is best measured in terms of probability distribution functions" (Jorion, 2001, as cited
in Samson, Reneke & Wiecek, 2009, p. 559). The context of this definition is financial
risk, specifically market volatility. From this definition several points can be ascertained.
First, uncertainty exists and must be managed. Second, the financial community is
focused on the outcome of the uncertainty - the end result, not the cause or the measures
in place to mitigate. A final point is that risk can be measured and quantified as a
distribution function, implying there is sufficient historical data to create accurate
distributions - a serious concern with underwater terrorism that has less than 100 events
on public record.
Shifting from a qualitative perspective to a quantitative discussion, risk is frequently
defined as the combination of the probability of an event and the consequences of the
event or, mathematically, a convolution of variables (Daneshkhah, 2004; ISO, 2009;
Jenelius, Petersen & Mattson, 2006).

Kaplan and Garrick advance a two-variable

definition when they discuss their risk triplet approach where each scenario has two
variables: the probability of the scenario, p(S,), and the consequence, C, of that scenario
(Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). The risk triplet (3-tuple) is {Si, p(Sj), C|Sj}, where Sj is the Ith
scenario, and i is merely the number given to identify a specific scenario (Kaplan, 2002;
Kaplan & Garrick, 1981).
Some authors have expanded the concept of the probability of the event to include the
threat and vulnerability elements while retaining the consequence (Darby, 2004, 2006;
Moteff, 2004).
definition:

They have utilized mathematical notation to form the following
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Equation 1: Risk defined with three probabilities: threat, vulnerability and consequence
Risk (R) = p(Threat (T)) * p(Vulnerability (V)) * p(Consequence (C))
or
R = p(T)*p(V)*p(C)
Where the

symbol represent convolution, not multiplication.

Taking the mathematical concept one step further, and providing an avenue for managing
the probability distributions in risk, Willis, et al. (2005) proposed a measure of terrorism
risk as "the expected consequence of an existent threat, which for a given target, attack
mode, and damage type can be expressed as:

Equation 2: Risk defined as expected consequence
Risk = p(attack occurs) *
p(attack results in damage | attack occurs) *
E(damage | attack occurs and results in damage)" (p. 10)
Again, the

represent convolution.

Similar to Equation 1, this definition, strongly rooted in probability theory, still harkens
back to the basics: probability of an event exists and consequences can be associated with
that event - the common theme observed across all disciplines researched.
Using probability functions for underwater terrorism is problematic because the amount
of data available to produce a probability distribution is scarce. Recall that probability is
used to represent the frequency an event occurs on the state of knowledge. For example,
probability as a frequency is defined as the number of successes divided by the number of
attempts of a specific trial. In one of the common textbook examples for frequentist
probability, the example of a coin toss is given where the probability of getting heads on
a fair-coin flip is 50%. However, this measure is dimensionless (it has no specific time
duration) and does not provide limits for response to a threat.
When probability is used as a measure of a state of knowledge (known as Bayesian
probability), it is measuring the uncertainty inherent in the state of knowledge. When
examining the state of knowledge uncertainty can be one of two types: aleatory
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uncertainty or epistemic uncertainty. Aleatory uncertainty is due to uncertainty in the
problem itself, and is often called random or inherent uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty
comes directly from the state of knowledge the observer or participant has (Darby, 2006).
However, in the current methods of determining probability, each method assumes
attacks are ergodic, that is, from observing past events one can accurately predict the
future. This approach is flawed because risk evolves over time as adversary's resources
and intentions change (e.g., motivational changes, adapting to defenders tactics or law
enforcement activity). Jenelius, Petersen and Mattson (2006) emphasize that:
Estimating the probabilities of extreme events such as natural disasters and
terrorist attacks is very difficult. The probabilities are predicted from
historical data, which implies that the circumstances around the event
remain the same at all times and that all causal connections are known, (p.
540)
Each of the previous definitions contains variables of a widely used definition of risk and
is adopted as the definition for this research in the following form: risk is the product of
threat, vulnerability and consequence (Darby, 2006; Moteff, 2004; Willis, et al., 2005) or
more precisely:
Equation 3: This research's definition of risk
Risk (R) = Threat (T) * Vulnerability (V) * Consequence (C)
or
Definition 3: Risk
R = TVC
The difference between this definition and Equation 1 is the basis on probability. This
definition convolutes the values of threat, vulnerability and consequence independent of
how the values are determined. Each variable will be discussed in more detail in Sections
0,0 and 0.
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2.2.1. Threat
Threat is the variable that defines the intentions and capabilities of the attacker. In the
literature, threat has many different definitions and is addressed in diverse ways. For
example, Haimes and Horowitz (2004) define threat as "a potential intent to cause harm
or damage to a system by adversely affecting its states" (p. 34). In 2005, Willis, et al.,
(2005) argue that threats are "external, dynamic forces acting on targets or infrastructure"
(p. 51). Note the focus on external forces, thereby eliminating one potential area of
threat: internal collaborator or actors. They contend that "threats to a target can be
measured as the probability that a specific target is attacked in a specific way during a
specified period" (Willis, et al., 2005, p. xvi) and is written as:
Equation 4: Threat as a probability that an attack occurs
Threat = p(attack occurs)
Interestingly, this measure details a certain type of attack on a specific target, which is an
unrealistic constraint on the threat analysis because of the large uncertainty that exists in
the terrorist threat environment.
However, Willis et al. (2005) parse threat into intent and capability, something that is
agreed upon by more than one author (Moteff, 2004; Roper, 1999; Willis et al., 2005) and
the intelligence community, in general. "The key to quantifying the threat (target,
weapon, and delivery system) of a terrorist attack is being able to account for varying
levels of uncertainty about the likelihood of the threat" (Garrick, et al., 2004, p. 137).
Because the intelligence community is focused on detecting and thwarting an attack, they
usually view threat in terms of groups of attackers.

Willis's (2005) attack-type

perspective (p. 6) brings increased utility to analysts and planners because it focuses on
what targets are threatened by what type of attack vice being focused on the whom and
the why of the attack. This approach is aligned with the engineering communities'
practice of risk analysis (see Ayyub, 2005; Pate-Cornell, 2005; von Winterfeldt &
Rosoff, 2005).
Other perspectives on the variables contained in the definition of threat include
motivation, capability, opportunity and impact (Vidalis, 2004) or the "combination of an
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asset, a vulnerability and an attacker" (Bauer, 2002, p. 1). Bauer (2002) asserts an asset
is anything the defender wishes to protect and defines attackers, occasionally called
"actors", as anyone, to include drug cartels, other government agencies or industrial spies
(p. 3).
For this research, the definition of threat will combine several key elements noted above.
The intent or desire to do harm will be taken as motivation. The capability of an
aggressor must also be considered, for without a means to do harm, there is no threat.
However, the intent or the capability may not be completely known even to the aggressor,
a fact which does not diminish the actual threat to the facility but merely indicates the
level of planning conducted thus far. An important argument not noted in the previous
discussion is the damage caused by non-events.

The value of a well planned and

executed public relations attack (e.g., releasing photographs of aggressors within a
nuclear facility without actually damaging that facility) should not be underestimated.
The effect would be very similar to a successful physical attack in influencing the
government and the associated public. Using these concepts, this research will define
threat as:
Definition 4: Threat is the intent and the capability of an external aggressor to adversely
affect a target, e.g., a critical infrastructure.
In the previous discussion for threat, a common thread exists that is eloquently argued by
Darby (2006): "A terrorist attack is not a random event; it involves a specific scenario
that is selected, planned, and implemented by the adversary" (p. 9). Since this statement
is taken to be true, then the use of random modeling and methods of risk analysis based
on randomness is flawed.

He continues that "terrorist acts are intentional and an

evaluation of them involves considerable epistemic uncertainty. Traditional probabilistic
risk analysis techniques have difficulty modeling the risk from terrorist's acts due to the
inherently large epistemic uncertainty" (Darby, 2006, p. 12). Additionally, this research
will not assume, similar to Levitin and Ben-Haim's (2008) approach to the evaluation of
risk, that an attack will occur, to wit that p(attack occurs) = 1.0.
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This theme echoes throughout the current body of literature. Only in the past few years
have academia and industry attempted to resolve uncertainty in threat analysis using a
systematic and robust methodology (Bernhardt, 2004; Darby, 2006; Steinberg, 2005).
The uncertainty gap that exists between the current state and future states is exasperated
by the non-ergodic nature of human action and the incomplete knowledge of the analyst
or facility operator. Current methods, as outlined in Section 2.3, frequently force the
analyst to make epistemic statements about human behavior or attacker capabilities that
result in confusion for decision makers or an extraneous commitment of resources to
include operationalizing threat assessment to the tactical level (Suzic, 2005).
2.2.2. Vulnerability
The second variable of risk is vulnerability, which is a variable that defines the
characteristics of a facility or critical infrastructure. As with threat, a review of the
literature indicates there is not a universally accepted definition for vulnerability.
Holmgren (2004) defines vulnerability as "sensitivity to threats and hazards" (p. iii).
Jenelius, Petersen and Mattson (2006) provide a more specific definition that decomposes
vulnerability into two variables: probability of a hazardous event [threat -ed] and what
they call "exposure" which contains "the consequences of the event in a certain place" (p.
538). Willis, et al., (2005) provide a measure of vulnerability as "the probability that
damages (where damages may involve fatalities, injuries, property damage, or other
consequences) occur, given a specific attack type, at a specific time, on a given target, or,
Equation 5: Vulnerability as a probability of damage given an attack
Vulnerability = p(attack results in damage] attack occurs)" (p. 8).
Given the dependence on the occurrence of a specific attack type at a specific time and
the uncertainty of risk analysis of a vast array of threats, developing the matrix of
vulnerabilities for a critical facility or infrastructure can be bewildering.
For this research, vulnerability will focus on the critical infrastructure's security
techniques, tactics and procedures. To wit:
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Definition 5:

Vulnerability is the set of critical infrastructure-specific

opportunities available for an adversary to exploit in conducting operations,
including reconnaissance and operational attacks.
Borrowing from theory advanced by HellstrOm (2007) for cyber systems, the critical
infrastructure vulnerability analysis experiences increased complexity because the
various systems are usually designed and fielded

at different times (a temporal

dimension) and in different geographical places (a spatial dimension). HellstrSm
proposes four principles for a vulnerability reduction framework which could be
generalized as an aspect of this research: (1) functional interlocking - the systems'
functions are dependent on functions of other external systems. (2) Temporal
embeddedness - piecemeal additions and improvements introduce vulnerability by
building onto or over existing flaws. (3) Critical socio-technical tipping-points management of a critical system should have a focus on intervention which does not
disrupt social functionality (e.g., will the medicine kill the patient?) and (4) dynamic and
reversive effects - critical points of large socio-technical systems are dynamic and fluid.
(2007).
2.2.3. Consequence
The third variable of risk is frequently called the "so-what" variable: consequence.
Interestingly, consequence is frequently assumed to be intuitive - the end result of the
attack on the infrastructure would cause substantial impact to society served, and is not
given rigorous exploration in the literature. Willis et al. (2005) probably best define
consequence as "the magnitude and type of damage resulting, given a successful terrorist
attack" (p. 8) and provide a measure for consequence as "the expected magnitude of
damage (e.g., deaths, injuries, or property damage to a specific target) or,
Equation 6: Consequence as a probability of damage given an attack occurs
Consequence = p(damage | attack occurs and results in damage)" (p. 9).
This measure is the basis for this research's definition of consequence, accordingly,
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Definition 6: Consequence is the total subjective value of damage inflicted as the result of
an attack on critical infrastructure.
This definition includes the residual impact from that damage or loss of life such as loss
of income or potential future income.
2.2.4. Relationship between risk and uncertainty
The concepts of uncertainty and risk have a tenuous relationship, not just in engineering,
but also across many different disciplines. In their review of the different perspectives on
uncertainty and risk, Samson, et al., (2009) provide a helpful figure, recreated as Figure
4, which illustrates the relationship between risk and uncertainty currently encapsulated
by the body of knowledge. The four leaves in this tree represent significant differences in
opinion among authors and have seen numerous papers authored to resolve the conflicts.
Substantial support for the concept that epistemic uncertainty is risk exists across the
literature, especially from the economic and finance communities (Samson, et al., 2009).
For example, Mehr and Cammack (1961) assert, "...risk is defined as uncertainty" (as
cited in Samson, et al., 2009, p. 559). Several authors have used risk and uncertainty
interchangeably (e.g., Magee, 1961; Philippe, 2001). However, research efforts outside of
the finance community appear to be focused on parsing risk and uncertainty as different
concepts.

Uncertainty Is risk

Uncartaln(>yaidtlak«i»<l(ip«ndMit

Figure 4: Relationship between uncertainty and risk
(adapted from Samson, et al., 2009, p. 559)

As early as 1901, economists were separating risk and uncertainty, especially Willett,
who defined risk as the "objectified uncertainty regarding the occurrence of an
undesirable event" (as cited by Samson, et al., 2009, p. 559). He asserted that epistemic
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uncertainty of the subjective nature resulted "from the imperfection of man's knowledge"
(Samson, et al., 2009, p. 559). Bedford and Cooke (2001) also used uncertainty in their
definition of risk explaining that risk is really comprised of two elements: hazards and
uncertainty. The division of uncertainty and risk as different concepts requires a further
discussion of their dependencies: are risk and uncertainty independent?
The literature has examples that if uncertainty and risk are different concepts, it can also
be argued that they are independent. Pfeffer (1956) believed that risk and uncertainty
were counterparts of one another and that they differed by how they were measured. He
saw risk being measured by objective probability and uncertainty, which he defined as a
"state of the mind" being measured by subjective belief (Pfeffer, 1956 as cited in
Samson, et al., 2009, p. 560). The focus on the state of the analyst's mind supports the
linkage to epistemic uncertainty. Subjective belief is echoed in game theory where risk is
defined as an action, which could lead to a specific set of distinct outcomes, but
uncertainty's set of outcomes is potentially unknown or meaningless (Luce & Raffia,
1957).
The final two leaves, from the tree shown in Figure 4, the children branches of the
assertion that uncertainty and risk are dependent, have received considerable attention.
The first assertion is that uncertainty and risk are dependent and the dependency does not
imply that uncertainty depends on risk (Crowe & Horn, 1967), but that risk depends on
uncertainty (Macgill & Siu, 2005). This assertion can be seen in articles written for
engineering safety (Helton, Johnson, Oberkampf & Sallaberry, 2006; Moller & Hansson,
2008; Rao, Kushwaha, Verma, & Srividya, 2007; Yu & Harris, 2009); terrorism risk
analysis (Darby, 2004; Kaplan, 2002; Willis, et al., 2005); human decision analysis
(Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997) and transportation (Jenelius, Petersen & Mattsson, 2006).
Perhaps the greatest single argument that illustrates that uncertainty gives rise to risk is
the concept of removing all epistemic uncertainty - if a researcher had perfect knowledge
then there would be no risk because all the variables would be known for a time period.
Even without perfect knowledge the relationship between risk and epistemic uncertainty
can be explained by Willett (1901) when he asserts that uncertainty is greatest when the
degree of probability for risk is equal to one half. The researcher has no indication of
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what the outcome will be because the probability of any outcome is equal (Willett, 1901).
However, if the researcher can decrease uncertainty, even by the slightest, then the
impact on risk would be to either increase or decrease the risk probability (Willett, 1901).
How does one measure what one does not yet know? The concept of measurement as it
applies to epistemic uncertainty and risk is relative to the term in question. Epistemic
uncertainty is based on what the researcher does not know: it is a state of the mind, not a
state of the world (PfefFer, 1956). However, the units of measure and the upper and
lower bounds are either known or can be derived by additional research; albeit, the range
may exceed the tolerance of the model in use. Risk, on the other hand, can be measured
based on its expected value and the anticipated consequences (Daneshkhah, 2004; Kelly
and Smith, 2009). This value may be comprised of parameters which are subject to
uncertainty, leaving the value of the risk measurement to be suspect and only as good as
the uncertainty analysis which is applied to the parameters.
The ability to quantify epistemic uncertainty and risk is still one of the key areas open for
debate. Most authors agree that risk and uncertainty can be quantified (Barker & Haimes,
2008; Daneshkhah, 2004; Darby 2004; Helton, et al., 2006; Kelly & Smith, 2009; M6ller
& Hanson, 2008; Phillippe, 2001; Rao, et al., 2007; Willis, et al., 2005). However, the
quantification of epistemic uncertainty is usually in the form of expert opinion or
probabilistic estimates, and it lacks definitive repeatable answers. The use of fuzzy logic,
fuzzy sets and other tools intended to articulate and quantify epistemic uncertainty has
improved the ability to quantify this type of uncertainty (Darby, 2004). Once quantified,
both uncertainty and risk are applied to various methodologies in an attempt to develop
probability distributions.
Probability distributions for risk and uncertainty allow researchers to make estimates
about the frequency of occurrences for events. Little debate exists in the literature
concerning risk distributions.

However, distributions related to epistemic uncertainty

have some concerns with many authors believing it can be done (Barker & Haimes, 2008;
Daneshkhah, 2004; Helton, et al., 2006; Kelly & Smith, 2009; Phillippe, 2001; Rao, et al.
2007; Willis, et al., 2005); and some authors believing it cannot or should not be done
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(Darby, 2004, 2006; M6ller & Hanson, 2008). Quantifying and distributing rare events
are difficult using probability or statistics.

By the very nature of probability and

statistics, a large population is required in order to have significant confidence in the
distribution as a tool for probability. In many cases the use of simulations, including
Monte Carlo, can minimize this disparity. However, any quantification or distribution
based on a historic analysis must take into account that the values are only truly accurate
when all the parameters are the same over a specified time period for both the historic
event and the sought-after prediction.
Discussion of the uncertainty distribution curve has a serious detractor - what happens
when all the outcomes are not known because of epistemic uncertainty? Darby (2004,
2006) has developed ways to mitigate ambiguity and vagueness. By ambiguity, Darby
(2006) attempts to resolve which crisp set (traditional sets in set theory) has the correct
answer.

Whereas in vagueness, Darby (2004, 2006) is trying to resolve a lack of

sharpness for a fuzzy set - in other words - there is epistemic uncertainty in the set
membership; and members may have partial set membership.
2.3. Risk management in terrorism scenarios
The presence of risk necessitates risk management for mitigation of the effects that risk
may have on a complex system. Risk management in the underwater environment
requires processes that can be
applied to asymmetric warfare, in which elusive, secretive, and
decentralized threats engage in loosely coordinated, difficult to detect
behaviors. Capturing their behaviors through observation gathered by a
diverse collection of sensors is a daunting task fraught with uncertainty.
(Costa, Herencia-Zapana & Laskey, 2012, p. 715)
Examinations of the current methods for risk management indicate there are
predominantly three approaches employed: first is to essentially reduce the uncertainty
that underlies the risk; second is to mitigate the risk; and third is to accept and
communicate the nature of the risk (NATO, 2002).
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Within the United States government several agencies have responsibilities for maritime
terrorism prevention and response. The FBI has authority based in many statues and
directives. The Department of Homeland Security, with both the U.S. Customs' and
Border Patrol (CBP) and the U.S. Coast Guard, are tasked with preventing terrorists from
using cargo containers to smuggle people or weapons of mass destruction into the ports.
The Coast Guard is assigned as the lead federal agency responsible for port security
(Maritime Transportation Security Act, 2002) and uses a Maritime Security Risk
Assessment Model (MSRAM) that utilizes Equation 2, from Section 0, taxonomy and
metrics to measure risk at various levels of detail. Additionally, MSRAM is used by the
Department of Homeland Security to evaluate maritime counter terrorism grant programs
(Edmonson, 2006).
Numerous industry-specific evaluation approaches for protection of critical infrastructure
have been fielded by various industry organizations (e.g., NEI or EPRI), the government
(e.g., NRC, DOE or DHS) or international associations (e.g., IAEA) for nuclear facilities
(Edmonson, 2006; EPRI, 2003; IAEA, 2003; U.S. NRC, 2008). For example, the oil and
chemical industry has AIChE/CCPS. Regardless of the industry or the estimating entity,
no method adequately addresses the uncertainty in the threat variable, thus reducing the
effectiveness of any associated risk management methodology. Furthermore, the various
risk management methods can be parsed into categories based upon the metrics used,
generally defined as simple indicator, event-based or aggregate (Willis, et al., 2005).
2.3.1. Simple indicator
The simple indicator methodology uses understandable metrics and widely available data
to form simple indicators such as population-based indicators that correlate consequence
to population and threat to population density. The metrics for simple-indicators are
usually well understood by policy makers; however, simple indicators do not adequately
reflect the relationships between threat, vulnerability and consequence (Willis, et al,
2005). For example, in 2006, Patterson and Apostolakis presented a methodology that
was focused on vulnerability based on stakeholder input but did not address the threat
variable. It continued the work of Apostolakis and Lemon (2005) on mean cut sets (mcs)
that requires a value to be assigned to them. The process of value assignment requires an
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evaluation of the conditional probability that terrorists would successfully attack a given
mcs. Because value assignment is extremely difficult to do, many authors separate the
vulnerability from the conditional probability of a successful attack.
Darby (2006) developed a model which adequately reflects the relationships between the
variables in the risk equation when he applied "non-probabilistic techniques to an overall
evaluation of risk from acts of terrorism, including the likelihood of attack" (p. 9) in his
Adversary/Defender

model.

He

uses

belief/plausibility measures from

the

Dempster/Schafer theory of evidence to represent uncertainty as a means to capture both
epistemic and aleatory uncertainty by using simplistic variables that are reduced to
independent probabilities. Darby (2006) built dependence into the model by establishing
the Adversary model on the attackers' goal of maximizing consequence and the
defenders' goal to minimize risk.

He suggests the model could be improved by the

probability measures being modified by Bayesian update techniques. Bayes' theorem has
been used in methods such as probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) and probabilistic safety
analysis (PSA) (Roland & Moriarity, 1983).
Bayes' theorem can be used to quantify uncertainty by representing all decisions with
precise probabilities "since the rational decision-maker always, at least implicitly, assigns
a probability value to each potential outcome" (Mailer & Hansson, 2008, p. 777). These
probability values essentially represent the decision maker's lack of knowledge, one of
the categories of uncertainty. Garrick, et al. (2004), assert that in a Bayesian construct
"uncertainty refers to the parameters that are used to measure risk and how these
parameters represent uncertainties in information and modeling" (p. 141). A serious
concern for applying the Bayesian approach is epistemic uncertainty, which by its very
nature, may not be reducible to a unique probability. This constraint has contributed to
the demand for including non-probabilistic epistemic uncertainty into the analysis
(M5ller & Hansson, 2008).
In addition to the difficulty in quantifying a decision maker's lack of knowledge, there is
also the difficulty in quantifying other qualitative parameters - like target prioritization.
Woo (2002) urges invoking Fechner's Law (also called Weber-Fechner's Law or
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Weber's Law) "which states that an arithmetic progression in perceptions requires a
geometrical progression in their stimuli" (p. 14). Fechner's Law is usually applied in
cases where the magnitude of the sensation is not discriminated with near absolute
certainty (Shigemoto, 2002). Another theory, that is closely related, is Steven's Power
Law, which describes the relationship between the magnitude of a stimulus and its
perceived intensity. Steven's Power Law is usually used where the magnitude of the
sensation is discriminated with some certainty (Smelser & Baltes, 2001). The application
of Steven's Power Law permits a simple indicator understandable metric for decision
makers but, in truth, the theory is based on physical stimulus and not societal reactions.
2.3.2. Event-based
Event-based models, like the RMS Terrorism Risk Model employed by the insurance
industry, provide a significant improvement in detailed analysis, including sensitivity
analysis, and extend across multiple types of events or multiple targets. Frequently the
models will include expert judgment, which improves accuracy in describing the details
but may force the model to be populated with estimated parameters thereby increasing
uncertainty. Event-based methods provide a means of overcoming the arbitrariness of
simple indicators of risk, which rely on presumptive correlated relationships (Willis, et
al., 2005). As a derivative of the event-based model, Levitin and Ben-Haim (2008)
introduce a model that uses a universal generating function with probabilities and
probability vectors representing attacker values to focus on damage caused to a complex
system by intentional attack.
Koonce, Apostolakis & Cook (2008) propose a methodology based on the MIT Risk
Ranking methodology to conduct a systematic development of the ranking of their
variables, principally intent, capability and resources, within a bulk power grid for both
random acts and deliberate acts, which is based on stakeholder input. They assert "the
risk assessment of infrastructures presents additional difficulties due to their diffuse
nature" (p. 171) and note that Apostolakis & Lemon's (2005) work "...assumes a 'minor'
level of threat to be present" (p. 171) which is an assumption that drives security costs
upward regardless of the actual threat (which may, in fact, be non-existent).

This

assumption is also echoed in Johnson, Khater and Kuzak's (2005) advice to "assume the
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facility is a credible target" (p. 8). They suggest one area for additional work is
identification and modeling of more specific users groups on the power grid to better
establish the consequence on users.
2.3.3. Aggregate estimator
The third method, introduced by Willis, et al., (2005) is called the aggregate estimator
method and is based on practices from economic forecasting that aggregates information
from multiple models or experts. However, Willis, et al.'s (2005) methodology is not the
only aggregated methodology currently used. Sandia National Laboratories Vulnerability
Assessment Methodology for Chemical Facilities (VAM-CF) considers risk as "a function
of the severity of consequences of an undesired event, the likelihood of an adversary
attack, and the likelihood of adversary success..." (Jaeger, 2002, p. 15). Prior to
completing the vulnerability assessments the threat must be described. The VAM-CF
uses type of adversary, tactics, and adversary capabilities, which are defined as number of
adversaries, weapons, equipment and transportation. Jaeger (2002) then explains that
"the potential for attack is determined based on the existence, capability, history/intent
and targeting... [as well as] the attractiveness of the potential target" (p. 17).
2.4. Underwater terrorism
This research focuses on the threat of underwater terrorism, itself a subset of maritime
terrorism, within the context of critical infrastructure; thus, a clear definition of
underwater terrorism is necessary. Defining underwater terrorism is a difficult task since
over 100 definitions of terrorism exist that spans over 20 definitional variables (Laqueur,
1999; Schmid & Jongman, 1988). Examining the basic concepts within the United
States, the United States Code defines international terrorism as activities that, according
to law, would be criminal and involve violent or dangerous actions intended to influence
or intimidate the government or its citizens (Crimes & Criminal Procedures, 2006).
Inherent in that definition are mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.
The U.S. Department of Defense states terrorism is the "unlawful use of violence or
threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies...often motivated by
religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that
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are usually political" (Joint Doctrine Division, 2010, p. 368). Note that both definitions
contain the key point that terrorism is violence intended to influence the government to
change its policies.
Lorenz (2007) focuses the definition on maritime terrorism when he proposes maritime
terrorism is "the use or threat of violence against a ship (civilian as well as military), its
passengers or sailors, cargo, a port facility, or if the purpose is solely a platform for
political ends" (p. 4).

Lorenz's definition does not address piracy, which can be

differentiated from terrorism by its motivation: piracy is criminally motivated and
maritime terrorism is politically motivated (Greenberg, et al., 2006). Motivation is the
fundamental difference necessary for the definition of maritime terrorism that will be
used in this research:
Definition 7: Maritime terrorism is the premeditated use of violence or coercion (such as
hijacking a ship and holding hostages without hurting anyone) within the marine
environment to influence government behavior for political or ideological gain.
According to the RAND database on terrorism, only 0.37% of the terrorist incidents from
January 1968 until March 18, 2008 were maritime related (RAND Worldwide Incident
Terrorism Database, 2008). Analysts assume the low number of maritime security
incidents can be attributed to the high level of expense, training and complex technical
capabilities necessary to successfully conduct a maritime mission (Medalia, 2005;
Richardson, 2004). The difficulties specifically include acquiring maritime vehicles or
equipment, specialized maritime skills, and waterproof weapons or explosives. Given the
value for the dollar, maritime attacks usually have a low ratio of benefit to cost and they
are often abandoned in favor of other operations.
Several terrorist groups are considered to have significant maritime capabilities including
the Middle Eastern Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Fattah, Hezbollah, and the South
East Asian Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (Lorenz, 2007). An example of a successful maritime terrorist
attack is the small craft suicide attack on the USS Cole, on October 12, 2000. A 35-foot
boat, loaded with explosives, pulled alongside the Cole while it was refueling in Aden,
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Yemen and exploded, killing 17 sailors and injuring 47 more. The attack resulted in
$250 million in damages and required 18 months for repairs (GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.).
Although the incidence of maritime terrorism, in relation to other forms of terrorism, is
relatively low and the incidence of underwater terrorism is even lower, amounting to a
handful of documented incidents; history belies the threat as underwater terrorism is a
becoming an attractive alternative to terrorist organizations. One example is Abdul alRahim al-Nasheri, sometimes called the Prince of the Sea, who was the chief of
operations for al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula until November 2002. He based his
operations on four variables, one of which was possessing underwater demolition teams
(Richardson, 2004). The grave consequences associated with successful underwater
attacks increase the attractiveness of this method for al-Nasheri and other terrorists.
Underwater terrorism also offers other benefits including the ability to operate undetected
and the difficulty of defending against attacks. Over the past ten years, advances have
been made in underwater sensors, but the underwater environment still remains a difficult
area to monitor because of the limited visibility, magnetic anomalies, sea floor debris,
harsh operating conditions, extraneous noise and the special equipment needed
(Dobkowski, 2007; Sakhuja, 2005).
Although the same conditions that make the underwater theater difficult to defend also
impose hardships on the attackers, recent changes to defensive posture and terrorist
training have increased the attractiveness of the underwater attack. As traditional, landand air-based targets become increasingly hardened against attacks, terrorists seek other
targets with an increased probability of mission success.

Whereas the underwater

environment had a lower probability of success because of its harsh environment, it now
has a greater probability of success than attacking a hardened target.
Additionally, terrorists are becoming more resourceful and better trained for the marine
environment. Abu Sayyaf, a militant Islamic separatist group based in the Philippines, is
known to have conducted training for scuba diver strikes, and al-Nasheri claimed alQa'ida could use both submersibles and "human torpedoes" (Sakhuja, 2005, np). Sri
Lanka's Navy experienced two losses associated to underwater terrorism: In the first
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instance a fast attack craft sank after experiencing a blast at 2:30 in the morning. This
blast may be attributed to improvised mines or to divers; the Sri Lankan government has
not released the details, but the Tamil Tigers took credit for the attack claiming that three
of their operatives had engaged the boat (Vasan, 2008a). In the second instance, known
to be a suicide diver, the 520 foot logistics support ship, formerly known as the
Invincible, was attacked and sunk while moored at Ashroff Jetty, Trincomalee
(DefenceWire, 2008; Vasan, 2008b). Authorities confirmed a suicide diver conducted
this attack because a piece of the diver's torso and diving equipment were recovered
(South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2008).
A trained diver would not have to blow himself up to be successful; the use of improvised
or stolen mines could be used to temporarily block harbors, destroy shipping or damage
land based critical infrastructure (e.g., water intakes to nuclear reactors) in either stand
alone attacks or as part of a choreographed attack on a harbor or coastal region
(Hasslinger, 2008). Colombo Port was spared an attack because of bad weather and
effective security. Eight ships had been targeted and the eight explosive packages with
timing devices and magnets, for attaching to the packages to the hulls, were recovered
(Fuard & Kamalendran, 2006). Although one of the attackers committed suicide with a
cyanide capsule, four others were arrested. Their boats also had frogmen's kits, oxygen
cylinders, mobile communication and navigation equipment and National Identity Cards
(Fuard & Kamalendran, 2006). Given the grave consequences of a successful waterborne attack, the increased attractiveness to adversaries for an underwater attack, and the
demonstrated planning and preparation of adversaries, attention to terrorist threat in the
maritime domain is vital.
The business community has been dedicating resources to the research and development
of devices to detect and thwart underwater terrorist attacks. The Underwater Inspection
Systems (UIS), manufactured by the CodaOctopus group, is a real-time threedimensional sonar that can be used to image the underwater theater. It can be used
proactively to first scan and develop a catalog of known objects in a port area. Then, if a
threat is received, a second scan can be conducted and compared with the first to
determine anomalies, which can later be investigated by response teams.

If an
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underwater catalog has not been created, the UIS can still be used to conduct an initial
search to assist the response teams in their planning. UIS can be used for bottom
scanning, piers and wharfs or examining the bottoms of boats, as necessary. Other
devices, similar to the UIS but designed to detect divers, are the Underwater Surveillance
System manufactured by Kongsberg Maritime and the Sentinel Intruder Detection Sonar
made by Sonardyne.

Three different manufacturers with viable products that have

successfully come to market and have been purchased by governments and police units
around the world indicate a need for underwater inspection and detection devices.
Effective deployment of these devices is a key concept that initiated this research.
Financial resources are limited and utilizing these tools represents a significant financial
commitment. The U.S. Coast Guard employs several of the devices mentioned above as
part of the Underwater Port Security System as an anti-diver tactic. The Coast Guard
also conducts an Underwater Terrorism Preparedness Program, which develops
actionable preparedness plans in partnership with all port agencies in a geographic area.
The program brings responders together before an incident to outline coordination and
control tactics, techniques and procedures that will be used at the port facility. The final
product is the Underwater Terrorism Prevention Plan for a port area (Branham, 2009).
Another indicator of the importance of a topic is seminars or meetings dedicated to the
topic and non-peer reviewed articles published by practitioners of the trade. Although
there has not been a dedicated underwater terrorism conference, many conferences have
been held related to various topics pertinent to underwater terrorism. For example, the
Mine Warfare Association has hosted conferences and proceedings annually dating back
to 2001 and five of the 13 themes for this year's Undersea Defense Technology
Conference and Symposium (Asia) are underwater terrorism related including Undersea
Port and Harbor Security (Underwater Defense Technology, 2010).
Within the literature, several articles have been published that discuss underwater
terrorism. In a trade magazine for military and defense industry, Hasslinger (2008)
describes a worst case scenario at the beginning of his article and then suggests several
actions government planners should consider, including improving the nature and scope
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of the United States' vulnerabilities, conducting war games and using the output of the
games to study the variables pertinent to the underwater theatre and to assess what
systems are required to restore services after an attack. Popular Mechanics, a general
audience magazine with numerous departments, discussed ways in which the U.S. Navy
may counter the threat of underwater terrorism (Pappalardo, 2009). Many user Internet
sites with news articles (with robust comments) or blogs exist that are dedicated to the
subject.
Unclassified scholarly research into underwater terrorism is minimal but indicates
academia is addressing this problem. One article, on asymmetric warfare, has two
paragraphs that describe the underwater domain as asymmetric in nature without
simulation capabilities (Hill, 2004). Another article is pertinent and discusses countering
underwater terrorism through either a sensor-centric approach or a capability-based
approach (Kessel, 2007). Both approaches mentioned by Kessel (2007) require the
defender to respond once the attacker is already actively attacking the facility.
Other academic material, not previously cited, ranges from the abstract, for example,
summarizing or mapping the existing terrorism research domain (see Kushman & Rubin,
2009; Reid & Chen, 2007) to the specific (e.g., effects on the human body of explosions
underwater, Almogy & Rivkind, 2007). A plethora of material exists, which may be
generalized to this research, that discusses collection of and analyzing data on terrorism
(see Gupta, 2005; Jonas & Harper, 2006) through the modeling (see Haimes, 2002) and
risk management (see Horowitz & Haimes, 2003; Jha, 2009; Liu, Chen, Gao & Jiang,
2005) processes. One aim of this research is to reduce the gap from the existing material
in terrorism to the specific and unique area of underwater terrorism by applying accepted
methods in risk management and uncertainty reduction.
2.5. Parameters
Pertinent to the discussion of underwater terrorism, is the discussion of the variables that
comprise the risk equation, ergo the parameters. In the intelligence community, threat is
first decomposed into the intent (I), capability (Ca) and activity (A) of the adversary such
that R = /[(ICaA)VC] (Bodnar, 2005; Chase, Day, Cline, & O'Hagan, 1995). Intent is
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comprised of the adversary's ideology, the stated goals of the adversary and the
adversary's propaganda history. Capability includes the adversary's tactics, techniques
and procedures, operational history and the availability of key resources, specifically
people and raw materials. Activity indicate the adversary is actively engaged in attack
preparations and includes logistics, movement of people, pre-operational planning,
training, pre-operational surveillance, information collection, and testing of the target.
The intent of an adversary, analogous to purpose, is indicated by the adversary's
ideology, goals and propaganda. Formally, an adversarial ideology is the ideas and
manner of thinking of the adversary, as a group, which oppose the defender, the
defender's ideology or the defender's values (Berman, 2008). Very closely related, but
distinct from ideology is stated goals, which are the explicitly declared results desired
that the adversary is working towards. It would be naive to consider that the stated goals
of an adversary are truly representative of the collective. However, for the purpose of the
overall understanding of risk, abstraction of the stated goals to the collective members of
the adversarial organization is both suitable and appropriate (Thompson, 2006). Stated
goals should not be confused with motivation, which is more personal in nature and tied
to individual actors. Propaganda is the spreading of ideas and information for the
purpose of helping the adversary's cause or to damage the defender's cause (Propaganda,
2011). It "consists of the planned use of any form of communication designed to affect
the minds, emotions, and action of a given group for a specific purpose" (Linebarger,
1954, p. 39).
The capability indicates the adversary's ability or competency to execute an attack and
examines past operations and the accumulation of people and material. Critical to
assessing the adversary's capabilities is understanding the adversary's tactics, techniques
and procedures, usually referred to by its abbreviation, TTP. TTP is comprised of three
distinct actions that guide the operation based on the evolving knowledge and experience
(U.S. Army, 2011): tactics are the employment of people working in relation to one
another; techniques are non-prescriptive methods used employ a tactic and "procedures
are the standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks" (Ibid, p. 6).
Experts have some indication that adversarial groups either transfer information or learn
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from each other concerning successful TTP (Hedges & Karasik, 2010). As with any
organization, an adversary also learns from past successes and mistakes. An adversary's
operational history consists of the past operations conducted by the adversary and
provides an understanding of what influences, including cultural, social, economic and
political forces, impact the organization.
As in any organization, people are the key resource, which form the foundation of this
research. Without people, from leadership to front line "soldiers", an adversary would
not exist.

Terrorist organizations use similar methods to recruit and train people

regardless of the tactics, techniques or procedures employed in their attacks (Ozeren,
Gunes & Al-Babayneh, 2007). It also appears that terrorist organizations operate under
less restrictive norms of rationality (Thompson, 2006).
Vital to any successful attack is the acquisition of materials for the operation, including
weapons or explosives, and special equipment for operation in the unsympathetic
underwater environment.

The acquisition of key resources necessary to conduct

operations, either through legal means (purchasing) or illegal means (stealing, black
market) may include material necessary to conduct pre-operational requirements, for
example, flight manuals (Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center, n.d.).
The final disaggregation of threat includes action, which is the process of performing an
act or activity.

In any attack, training must occur beforehand to indoctrinate the

organization's people on its tactics, techniques and procedures. Training is not the formal
training as defined from the discipline of human performance technology.

Instead,

training implies any intervention meant to teach a person a particular skill or behavior.
Training includes providing digital manuals, circulating paper propaganda with a generic
vision, mission and instructions to the more formal organized training camps where
people prepare physically and mentally to accomplish tasks. To prepare for both the
attack and any pertinent training, material must be moved to training areas or attack sites.
Moving material is logistics, which is narrowly defined as the movement and
maintenance of material (U.S. Army, 1985). An underwater attack requires particular
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materials and processes to effectively deploy an attack and this specificity is discretely
observable by the defender.
In addition to moving material for training or operational staging, the movement of
people must occur. Movement of people is narrowly defined as the change of physical
location of people to accomplish tasks, including training, pre-operational surveillance or
testing or positioning of people for the planned attack. Conceptually movement of people
is more concerned with long distance travel (e.g., transnational flights) vice the daily
commuting required for shopping, communications or pre-operational activities. People
are also required for pre-operational planning, essentially the process of developing
"tasks, in a prescribed order, that are intended to reach a desired operational end state,
normally within a given time" (Zhang, et al., 2001, p. 3).
The final three elements of action can be combined into a concept called probing (Gay,
2012).

Probing exists when an adversary explores the target through information

collection, pre-operational surveillance and testing. Information collection occurs when
an adversary attempts to gain information about a place, person or operation pertaining to
a target, usually through inquiries including online searches (Indiana Intelligence Fusion
Center, n.d.). Pre-operational surveillance involves an adversary observing a target to
determine strengths, weaknesses and the number of emergency personnel that may
respond to an incident (Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center, n.d).

Pre-operational

surveillance is different from information collection because surveillance requires people
to observe the defender directly and provides an opportunity for defenders to receive
indicators of adversarial activity (STRATFOR, 2005). Near the final stages of pre
operational planning, adversaries may conduct testing. Testing is the adversarial actions
intend to activate defender response to penetration of security barriers (Indiana
Intelligence Fusion Center, n.d.) and is useful in validating the efficacy of the operational
plans.
2.6. Ongoing Research
The deficiencies in the theoretical and methodological approaches noted above are being
addressed by academia. For example, Guikema (2012) examined the necessary
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conditions for intelligent adversary models and partnered with Aven to parse the sources
of uncertainty within the analysis practice (Aven & Guikema, 2011). Bristow, Fang and
Hipel (2012) suggested utilizing systems of systems methodologies for advancing the risk
management of extreme events, a similar concept to this research.

At a more

methodological level the exploration of game theory has been suggested as a means of
adversarial risk analysis that includes the concepts of intelligent adversaries (Rothschild,
McLay & Guikema, 2012). Other methods have been advanced even further including
decision analytics (Dillion-Merrill, Parnell & Buckshaw, 2009; Parnell, Smith & Moxley,
2010) and Bayesian reasoning (Costa, Herencia-Zapana & Laskey, 2012).

The

explorations conducted by these authors validates the gaps this research seeks to close in
the body of knowledge
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHOD

3.1.

Meaning

The purpose of this research is to advance the ability to manage and understand the risk
of an underwater terrorist attack. The research contributes to the body of knowledge by
analyzing unclassified historic data to articulate the key parameters and their
relationships, in the threat element of the risk equation. The research also presents a
geometric model of the risk equation which assists decision-making by facilitating an
understanding of the relative risk of an underwater terrorist attack given two, or more,
scenarios.
3.2.

Theoretical Framework

Although the three phases of this research are derived from the Code of Best Practice for
Experimentation (Albert & Hayes, 2005), the research employed many layers of
abstraction in its design. Figure 5, the Ladder of Abstraction, illustrates those layers
graphically. The ladder proceeds from the researcher's worldview, located at the top of
the ladder, steadily downward to the conceptual and operational definitions for this
research. The following sections articulate the ladder of abstraction.
3.2.1. Researcher's Worldview
The theoretical assumptions of a researcher's ontology and epistemology directly impact
the methodology selected by that researcher.

The methodology is the mechanism that

enables a researcher to develop an understanding of reality. Evolving from the epistemic
basis of realism, the research investigates qualitative data by examining the causative
factors and variables in the identification of an adversarial threat to underwater critical
infrastructure. Furthermore, those causative factors and variables will be used to develop
a model to evolutionarily test hypotheses on the creation of a polyhedron risk model in
the underwater domain.
Krauss efficiently summarizes Lofland and Lofland's (2005) definition of meaning as the
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linguistic categories that make up a participant's view of reality and with
which actions are defined.

Meanings are also referred to by social

analysts as culture, norms, understandings, social reality, and definitions
of the situation, typifications, ideology, beliefs, worldview, perspective or
stereotypes, (p. 762)

Researcher's beliefs & assumption: my worldview

Framework, theories & concepts used to articulate the problem,
purpose & structure for the research

Empirical - what can be observed: the variables

Conceptual and operational definitions

Figure 5: Ladder of abstraction

Given that Western culture and society is fundamentally different from the norms of the
perceived adversaries, applying Western contexts and understanding of reality to those of
the adversary may provide inaccurate definitions, interpretations or justifications for the
adversary's behavior. The researcher is known to be handicapped by the perception
barrier and may have unknowingly introduced bias in understanding an adversary's
intentions and capabilities.
3.2.1.1.

Ontology

Ontology, essentially the philosophy of reality, is the understanding of entities,
relationships and interactions at the highest levels of physics and society.

The
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understanding of the nature of all things is based on either individual or collective
conceptualizations - essentially formulating explanations for observed phenomena. The
conceptualizations are based on perspective and social influences (e.g., the Galilean
argument of the center of the solar system - as being Sun or Earth centric was based on
teachings up to that point and challenged by the new information). A researcher's
ontological assumptions will influence the choice of methods employed and the resulting
conclusions.
The researcher's ontology is generally positivistic - truth is independent of the
researcher.

However, reality, when considering the nature of the research subject,

adversary's intent on doing harm, should be conceptualized as the ultimate goal, not the
immediate actions or intentions of the adversary. The researcher suggests this research,
even if discovered by the subjects, will not change the nature of reality on the immediate
articulation of reality and this truth was discovered empirically by applying both
qualitative and quantitative methods.
3.2.1.2.

Epistemology

Epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge, an understanding of how we come to
know and the relationship between the knower and the known (Krauss, 2005).

A

researcher's epistemology is the foundation for how the researcher develops knowledge
about his/her ontology, in essence, the basis of the researcher's reality.
The researcher's paradigm is more centered on the epistemic continuum - one of realism,
which contains elements of both positivism and constructivism (Healy & Perry, 2000).
The researcher believes, and approached this research with this conceptualization: that
there exist multiple perceptions about a single, mind-independent reality (Healy & Perry,
2000). The researcher believes there are differences between the actual reality and
peoples' (whether individual or collective) perceptions of reality. By using empirical
methods the researcher endeavored to foster knowledge utilizing a variety of "theoretical
reasoning and experimentation" (Outhwaite, 1983, p. 332).
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3.2.2. Framework, theories and concepts
This research draws from a diverse foundation for theories and concepts including
organizational, systems, risk, and uncertainty theory. Furthermore, the research is based
on the language and functions inherent in set theory, graph theory and geometry.
In studying the behavior of the complex adversarial organization, the doctrine of
organizational theory was employed. Organizational theory provided a multidisciplinary
and systems based strategy to research both the parameters and relations at a macro-level.
Applying principles from anthropology, the organizational culture was dissected into
quantitative parameters and further studied. Organizational theory provided a plethora of
methods including multiple regression, non-parametric statistics, meta-analysis and
ANOVA. It also provided philosophy on the study of the rationality of an adversarial
organization and its structure, control and technology.

It also permitted a systems

framework to be applied to interpret the complex dynamic goal-oriented processes
demonstrated by the adversarial organizations.
Paramount to this research was application of the tenets of systems theory. Systems
thinking provided a framework and techniques to reduce the adversarial organization
holistically. The relationship between the adversary and the defender was built upon the
concepts of the system-environment boundary, input, output, process, state, information
and goal-directedness. The philosophy of the research was based on the whole system
concept - essentially that a defender cannot exist in the defending state without the
existence of an adversary and that one's actions directly impacts the other, even if
knowledge of the action is non-existent. The research also leveraged equifinality across
the geometric model to offset the areas of the model with increased uncertainty.
Both Risk and Uncertainty theory provided significant influences in the approach and
development of the mathematical model. Applied Risk theory has traditionally been
focused on decision-making under probabilistic uncertainty and was influential in
approaching the analysis of the parameters and relations. The Risk Index, the Risk
Measure, the Uncertainty Measure and the Loss Function inspired the mathematical
concepts for the model, providing both the approach and the structure. Additionally, the
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malice spectrum for quantifying the parameters is derived from the maximum uncertainty
principle.
In both the approach and the implementation of the parametric research, set theory
provided language and arithmetic functions. The model's mathematical basis is derived
from applying set theory to the parameters and relations described as objects.
Maturing the relationship between the objects collected within the sets, graph theory
provided the language and a theoretical background for the development of the
mathematical structure used to model the relations between the parameters. Graph theory
also provided the theoretical foundation for the development of the matrix, which
executes construction of the network diagram, forming the structure of the geometric
model.
Finally, geometry provided the language and theoretical basis for the instantiation of the
polyhedral model, including the location of the nodes as coordinates and the
determination of the volume and the surface area.
3.2.3. Empirical basis
The empirical basis for this research is derived from experimentation that tests the
hypothesis concerning the relationship between the parameters observed in samples and
the relative risk between the samples. The original data obtained through observation of
the samples include (1) if a parameter is observable within a sample and (2) the evaluated
magnitude of the parameter in the sample. The data obtained through experimentation
are the output of the experiment, a dimensionless value representing a geometric value
relative to the specific sample.
Using the definition provided in Section 0, the parameters are both enumerable and
capable of being used in mathematical statements, ergo axiomatizable.
Several constraints on empirical purity were noted including the ability to observe the
parameters directly and the bias in determining vulnerability and consequence introduced
by the data deriving from Western, academic viewpoints as opposed to an adversarial
origin. The first constraint was minimized by using trusted sources of data and more than
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one source for each sample. The use of multiple data sources and trusted databases
elevated the expectation of data integrity by relying on other trained observers following
documented procedures and independently verifying those observations. The second
constraint, bias, is noted and accepted because the focus of the research is on the threat
element and not the vulnerability and consequence.
3.2.4. Definitions
Different nuances in the definitions of terms used across the risk and intelligence
domains exist. The definitions were taken from multiple sources, aggregated and then
simplified for clarity. Table 1 provides the term, the variable used and the applicable
definition.
Table 1: Operational definitions
Concept

Variable

Operational definition

Risk

R

R = Threat * Vulnerability * Consequence

Threat

T

T = Intent * Capability * Activity

Intent

I

I = Propaganda * Stated Intention * Adversarial ideology

Capability

C

Activity

A

Propaganda

P

Adversarial
ideology

i

Stated goals

g

Information
collection

f

C = Tactics, techniques & procedure * Operational
history * key resources (people) * key resources
(material)
A = Logistics * Movement of people * Surveillance *
Information collection * Testing
Propagating ideas and/or information for the purpose of
assisting the adversary's cause or to damage the
defender's cause
The beliefs that guide a group in opposition to the
Defender's ideology or values
The explicitly declared results desired that the adversary
is working towards.
An adversary's attempts to gain information about a
target during the pre-operational planning stage.
Table 1. (Continued)
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Concept

Variable

Consequence

c

Key resource people

k

Preoperational
planning

n

The process of developing plans to achieve an operational
goal.

Operational
history

0

The past operations conducted by the adversary.

Tactics, techniques
and procedures

t

People working together in non-prescriptive methods or
by following common methodologies.

Preoperational
surveillance

s

Observing a target to determine strengths, weaknesses
and forces available.

Key resources material

m

The acquisition of supplies necessary to conduct
operations.

Logistics

1

The movement of material.

Movement of
people

b

The change of physical location of people to accomplish
tasks.

Training

r

Any intervention meant to teach a person a particular skill
or behavior related to adversarial conduct.

Unique
environment

u

The setting or conditions in which the attack will be
conducted in or access to the Defender through.

Testing

e

Adversarial actions intend to provoke an observable
response to an aggressive stimulus.

v

"The set of critical infrastructure-specific opportunities
available for an adversary to exploit in conducting
operations, including reconnaissance and operational
attacks" (Gay & Hester, 2010, np).

Vulnerability

3.3.

Operational definition
The total subjective value of damage inflicted as the
result of an attack on critical infrastructure.
The people directly involved in conducting the attack,
including those that build and those that deploy the
weapon.

Rationale for method

This research methodology was chosen because of the degree of the problem formulation,
the data available, the environment of the study (to wit, manipulation of the variables ex
post facto), the methods accepted by the engineering community, and the quantification

50

of the data for sharing across diverse communities. The problem was strongly defined by
inputs (expected parameters), their characteristics and range of conditions and the output
(measure of relative risk and an understanding of what influences the value). The data
were available in publicly available databases, government sites and open media. The
experimentation method is accepted by the engineering community, and using the Code
of Best Practice as a guide, enhanced the integrity of the process. Quantification was
vital for analyzing the correlation of the parameters and for describing the magnitude of
the parameters during the experiment phase. Quantification also supported positivism,
which stresses an objective approach based on quantitative analysis and experiments.
Cohen, Lawrence and Morrison (2000) observed that there are four assumptions of
science: determinism, empiricism, parsimony and generality. This research, deterministic
in origin, researched the casual links for understanding the events driven by factors. In
collecting empirical evidence to support a hypothesis, and by robustly validating the
model, both empiricism and parsimony were upheld and facilitated generality.
An examination of the precepts of naturalism, qualitative in nature, indicated that it was
not well suited as a methodology for this research. Naturalistic research is subjective and
traditionally employs case studies and interviews as methodologies, neither of which
appear practical for this research. Pure case studies usually produce more detailed
information than statistical analysis but are often considered less credible and can be
biased by the researcher's intimate knowledge of the case (Hill, 1993; Lueck & Spurlock,
2003). Case studies are also difficult to generalize because they are based on qualitative
data that is generalizable to only a particular context (Lee & Baskerville, 2003; Yin,
1994). Another concern is the sensitive nature of any case study - in many instances the
case study would be classified and become unusable for this research. The second
option, conducting interviews, is not feasible and would be of dubious value since the
interview could prejudice the legal proceedings of the interviewed, creating doubt to the
integrity of the interview. Given the constraints enumerated and the nature of the
problem, model-based experimentation was indicated.
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3.4.

Research design

The research design followed a traditional waterfall input-process-output model of
hypothesis testing. Figure 6 illustrates elements of the research design including the
primary inputs and outputs for the research design, which are explained in the following
sections.
3.4.1. Input
The research design was impacted by six key inputs, outlined below. The inputs had
minimal variability but significant influence on the research design and were outside of
the control of the researcher.

Mathematical
laws & theory
Canon of
Science

Terrorism
databases
Intelligence
methodologies

Researchers
perspective

Parameter study
Measure of risk
Open
sources
Conceptual model

Executable model

Dissertation

Future
Research

Body of
Knowledge

Figure 6: Research design
3.4.1.1.

Open sources

Data were acquired utilizing publically available information including government,
academic, and news media sources.

Open source information provides a basis for
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understanding the minimal data available from the government or academic terrorism
databases. The information contained in open sources must be viewed in context and
examined for the source of the information when seeking collaboration. Three, four or
even more similar versions of the same fact may be propagated by one news company
and modified by local authors - indicating no collaboration of fact. The open source
news media provided an archive of analog material that was not available digitally,
except as a photograph or scanned image.
3.4.1.2.

Intelligence Community's methodologies

The perspective of both the researcher and the literature reviewed has been forged from a
defensive viewpoint, which has been influenced by the methodologies employed by the
intelligence community, which provided the initial categorization of data and heavily
influenced the reliability of those data.
3.4.1.3.

Terrorism Databases

The primary data for this research were obtained from unclassified governmental and
academic databases. Each database was selected for academic excellence and robustness.
However, the databases were representative of the defender perspective and limited in
scope by the designer of the database.

The databases available did not contain

standardized parameters or entries, requiring extensive cross-referencing and additional
data derived from open sources.
3.4.1.4.

Databases used

Three databases were used for the primary search for data.

The databases were

administered by either government or educational institutions that are Centers of
Excellence for terrorism research. The databases, shown in Table 2, did not include the
requisite data to conduct a robust analysis of the parameters but represent the initial
source of information that provided the foundation of this research.
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Table 2: Databases used in this research
Database Name
RAND Database of
Worldwide Terrorism
Incidents (RDWTI)

Parent Organization

Comments

RAND Corporation

A compilation of terrorism
data from 1972 through 2009

Global Terrorism
Database (GTD)

The National Consortium for
the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism
(START) located at the
University of Maryland

Worldwide Incidents
Tracking Systems (WITS)

National Counter Terrorism
Center (NCTC)

3.4.1.5.

An open-source database
including information on
terrorist events around the
world from 1970 through
2010
The U.S. Government's
database on acts of terrorism
compiled from open source
data from 2005 to 2010.

Mathematical laws and theories

Mathematical laws and theories provided influence by introducing some of the language
and theories for this research.
3.4.1.6.

Canon of science

The Canon of Science provided a standardized basis for comparison of all research on a
common ground through four criterions, commonly identified as Truth Value,
Applicability, Consistency, and Neutrality. Truth Value, or internal validity, is a tenet of
research design that includes such aspects as study rigor (the method used, care in
measurement and understanding of what wasn't measured) and considering what possible
alternative explanations may exist for the causal relationships observed (Huitt, 1998).
Applicability, also called external validity or generalizability, ensures the research can be
used more broadly and adds value to the research process. Consistency, sometimes
called reliability or replicability, allows for other researchers to validate or verify the
findings of the research both as a means of confirming the findings and as a basis for
advancing future research. The final criterion, Neutrality, focuses on the objectivity of
the research. Together, the Canon provides a framework upon which research the
research will be advanced.
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3.4.2. Research phases
Using the COBPE (Alberts & Hayes, 2005) as a guide, the research was parsed into three
phases: pre-experiment, experiment and post-experiment, which are shown in Figure 7.
During the pre-experiment phase the first three research questions were explored in detail
and the conceptual model, a mathematical construct, was developed. Data were obtained
from numerous sources, as noted in Section 0, and a multivariate analysis was conducted
to determine the relationships between the parameters.
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Experiment

•
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Analyze Sample

Analyze Sample

Analyze binary
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Figure 7: Research phases

Using the information obtained from the analysis and the mathematical model, a network
diagram was constructed to examine the model in a multi-perspective approach. The
network diagram facilitated examining the nature of the model (verification of the nature
of the relationships, open or closed construct, number of surfaces, etc.) prior to
construction of the executable model. Finally, the executable model was constructed and
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tested. At this point, the fourth research question, what is the measure of risk, remained
unanswered. Upon completion of the testing of the executable model, per Section 3.5.5,
the pre-experiment phase was completed.
Testing of the executable model found it to be valid, allowing testing of the null
hypothesis to commence. Using the same samples from the pre-experiment phase, the
research entered the second phase, the experimentation phase.

During the

experimentation phase, the values of each sample's parameters were run through the
model to determine the relative risk across the sample space. The first sample, n=26,
called Sample A, included output of both the surface area of the geometric shape and the
sum of the edges which comprise the geometric shape. The results from Sample A
demonstrated that calculating the surface area was contraindicated, therefore the second
sample, n=25, only had output for the sum of the edges of the geometric shape.
In the third phase, post experiment, an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the
sampling process, the impact of the hypothesis testing, and improvements to the
modeling process were completed. Details of this phase can be found in Section 3.7.
The results of the analysis from Sample A were used to improve the methodology for
Sample B.
External validity was facilitated by using the intelligence community's variables as a
basis and by conducting a robust analysis of the causal effects to derive the relationships.
Given the researcher's prior experience in this area, care was taken to validate both the
existence, and the value, of the parameter to mitigate the effects of the Rosenthal effect
(Rosenthal, 2002). To corroborate the parameters deduced from the analysis of the
samples, expert opinion was solicited from a group of risk and intelligence professionals.
To further generalization, mitigation of the situation—specific parameter "underwater
environment" was not used.

Instead, the parameter "unique environment" was

substituted. However, given that only cases of underwater terrorism were drawn as
samples, the constrained data sample remains a potential barrier to external validity.
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3.5.

Process

The actual experiment, although guided by the empirical process of hypothesis testing,
was an adaptive experiment intended to build and validate a model that facilitates
managing and understanding of the epistemic risk of an underwater attack. Although
described in serial fashion, the design evoked a reiterative nature, as shown in Figure 8,
which is based on the principles for conducting a model-based experiment from the
COBPE (Alberts & Hayes, 2005). Readers familiar with the COBPE should note that the
COBPE exists to support experimentation that answers questions about another area
under research whereas with this research, the area under research is the focus of the
experimental design.

Pre-experiment

Experiment

Develop
conceptual
modal

Post-experiment

Analysis

Conduct
model-based
experiments

Analyze
samples

Available
data

Prior research
& modeling

Revised
model

Figure 8: Research process
3.5.1. Phase 1: Pre-experiment
The pre-experiment phase focused on data collection and creation of the Human-in-the
loop model. The Data Collection Plan, Appendix A, documented the process used to
collect, protect and archive samples collected. A literature review was conducted to
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determine the appropriate process to quantify the qualitative data, as noted in Section 0.
Section 0 explains the data collection in more detail. Following data collection, a
multivariate analysis was conducted and critically reviewed. A detailed discussion of the
analysis process is described in Section 0. The results of the analysis were used to create
the conceptual model.

The conceptual model, mathematical in nature, facilitated

understanding of the quantitative parameters involved, the nature of the experiment, and
potential barriers to model validity.
The conceptual model and network graph enabled development and testing of the humanin-the-loop (HIL) model. The HIL model demonstrated the interactions and limits of the
executable model and assisted in the testing design, Section 3.5.5. The HIL model
evolved into the executable model and provided rapid analysis of functionality that
influenced the hypothesis testing and anomaly-handling precepts. The completion of the
executable model's validation and verification testing marked the transition to the
experiment phase.
3.5.1.1.

Quantifying qualitative variables

Since there exist numerous methods to quantify qualitative data (e.g., Chi, 1997; Darby,
2004; Dey, 1993; Shemmings, 2006) a literature review was conducted to determine the
most appropriate method which could be easily applied to the epistemic uncertainty
inherent in underwater terrorism. The literature review included products from the
National Intelligence Community (see publications from the Central Intelligence
Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence) and academic research pertaining to
information in the news media (e.g. Dunn, Moore & Nosek, 2005).
3.5.1.2.

Data collection

The research employed a deductive empirical cycle initially examining parameters from
previous research for a maritime risk analysis tool (Gay, 2006). Entering the databases
noted in Section 0, a keyword search was performed using the words listed in Table 3. A
review of the results of the key word search was conducted and relevant entries were
extracted and created the basis of the sample's population. An example of the data
collection log worksheet is given in Appendix B. Using the initial data set drawn from
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the databases, additional research was conducted with open source material (law
enforcement briefs, scholarly journals and open source media) to continue to develop the
attack's profile. Profiles of each scenario were examined utilizing multiple perspectives,
including the

intelligence community's threat

analysis, organizational

theory

prepositions, precepts of cyber terrorism studies and dive planning.
Table 3: Keywords used in database search
Underwater

Undersea

Submerged

Submarine

Marine

Maritime

Aquatic

Diver

Limpet

UWIED

Although there were many sources of information, a case was only accepted if it had at
least two trusted (defined as government or academic center of excellence) references.
No classified material was reviewed. However, open source (media or educational
institution) material was used to better understand the total scenario.
As the sample's profile was developed, data were examined for originality, fact, and
supposition and then compared against known organizations. For example, the profiles
of various terrorist groups are well documented and openly available (e.g., LTTE). This
information augmented the sample's profile, providing background for the sample where
the original sources may have omitted details. As data were examined, each sample's
data tested the null hypothesis - that the parameters indicated encompassed the domain of
knowledge about a particular sample.
Each sample was also specifically researched through the databases after the initial key
word search. As the samples were examined, the databases indicated additional crossreferences that were pursued as separate data points. The samples were cross-referenced
to ensure each sample indicated one, and only one, separate incident.
The output of the data collection was two matrices. The first matrix, called the Binary
matrix, was composed of the indicator variables, utilizing the number one to indicate the
parameters were noted in the specific case, or a zero, representing no indication of the

59

parameter was observed. The second matrix, called the Malice matrix, was composed on
the value, determined by using the Malice Spectrum, for each parameter in the model.
The Malice Spectrum presented in detail in Section 4.2, maps representative qualitative
judgments to quantitative values. Where the specific case provided no indication of the
value of the parameters, the value 0.5 (absolute uncertainty) was entered.
As a means to determine the importance and the ease of collecting the parameters used in
this research, expert opinion was solicited based on a survey-like tool. The instrument
was sent via email to a select group of known experts with a list of 21 parameters. Each
expert was asked to evaluate the 21 parameters for importance in determining the overall
risk and for ease in obtaining the value of the parameter. A Likert scale of one to five
was employed. For importance, five represented critically important. For ease, five
represented very difficult to obtain.
Four experts were selected to represent a cross section of maritime intelligence and
critical infrastructure risk analysis. The experts came from academia, the Department of
Homeland Security and from the Coast Guard's intelligence community. In addition to
asking the experts to evaluate the parameters, each expert was asked for his/her
experience in the field and formal training or education in the discipline. An expert was
defined utilizing two criteria - education in the domain and experience. The minimum
requirement for education was at least 160 hours of classroom instruction, or 20
classroom days, which is comparable to 10 credit hours of study. This criterion ensured a
basis for understanding of the vocabulary and methodologies available. The second
criterion, experience, was based on the emergent property of communities of practice.
The criteria of having accomplished at least 10,000 hours of practical experience within
the domain (Gladwell, 2008) equates to about five years of full time employment in the
domain.

The domains were homeland security risk and homeland security threat

analysis. The results of the solicitation were plotted on a scatter plot based on the
average value of the opinions provided.
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3.5.1.3.

Dummy variable definitions

In soliciting the expert opinion, seventeen of the parameters on the instrument were the
ones used in this research. The other four parameters, called dummy parameters, were
inserted as a control and to determine their value in the overall risk picture. The four
dummy parameters were selected because they are currently used in intelligence or risk
studies. Two parameters, population index and criticality are considered part of the
consequence element. Leadership was selected as a distracter since the leaders of an
organization are always important, but in the current distributed leadership model
employed by adversarial groups it may not be known. The final dummy parameter,
finance, is obviously vital to conducting any activity but does not directly relate to the
threat element. Finance relates to threat because it supports acquiring material, moving
people and material and enabling training. The specific definitions, as provided to the
experts are articulated below.
Leadership (a) is the "process of social influence in which one person can enlist the aid
and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task" (Chemers, 1997, p. 1)
through overall direction and strategy. Depending on the structure and primary influence
to the adversarial group, leadership may be a person or a group of people who guide or
direct the adversarial organization. Leadership can be viewed as the organizational
construct of command and control or the personalities of the leaders actually in specific
roles.
Finance (d) is the activity that includes the origination, marketing, and management of
cash and money surrogates through a variety of fund raising, capital accounts, and
investments created for supporting and entertaining the adversarial organization or to pay
for protection and asylum.
Directly linked to consequence, but frequently considered separately, is the population
index (x) of an area. Essentially, it is a measure of all of the people inhabiting a specified
area, including transients (e.g. commuters versus resident).

Population index is

occasionally measured as density, ergo, the number of people living per unit of an area
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(e.g. per square mile) or the number of people relative to the space occupied by those
people.
One parameter, which has been treated as part of consequence or as an independent
variable, is criticality (y). Criticality accounts for the severity of the consequences for the
entity. Criticality is directly related to the importance of the facility to a system and its
environment when considering a specific event and the impact of the loss of that facility.
3.5.2. Sample analysis
Utilizing the Binary matrix a multivariate analysis was conducted. The samples were
drawn from numerous databases and augmented by open source documents; thus the
variables were discrete random variables demonstrating a range of possible, but
countable, values, ergo a discrete random variable. This characteristic is attributed to the
origin of the samples, primarily the trusted databases and open source documents
generated by numerous authors for varying purposes. Utilizing the Binary matrix, two
analyses were conducted, covariance and correlation of coefficient, to evaluate the latent
structure contained within the set of variables from the sample. The covariance provided
the behavior between the parameters - whether similar or dissimilar. The correlation
coefficient provided the linear dependence. These analysis were run on both Sample A,
n=26, and Sample B, n=25, independently.

The threshold ranges accepted for the

Pearson's correlation was -1.0 to -0.5 and 0.5 to 1.0.
The results of the multivariate analysis were compared with the results of the critical
analysis and where there were differences, further analysis occurred. The additional
analysis included further research on the parameters of the sample and questioning the
validity of the parameters indicated in the initial sample. The additional research was
focused on questioning the efficacy of the process used to evaluate the sample, not on
adjusting the process to sample to the expected results.
3.5.3. Network graph
The network graph was generated using MATLAB© software. A 17 X 17 matrix was
created using ones to indicate where relationships exist, as indicated by of correlation
coefficient. Utilizing the biograph function a network graph was created, and visually
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analyzed. This analysis consisted of comparing the displayed nodes and edges with the
17 X 17 matrix to ensure equivalence and then comparing the network to the output
matrix of the multivariate analysis. Although the analysis of the table of parameters
indicated the existence of super-nodes (nodes connected to every other node), the
network graph indicated concerns with using volume or surface area of the resulting
geometric shapes - that the geometric shapes would be pulled apart by dissimilar values
of the edges. This concern was instrumental in creation of the error handling for the
Human-in-the-Loop and executable models. The length of the edges in the network were
determined by the MATLAB© biograph function and do not represent any particular
value. They exist only to visually indicate relationships.
3.5.4. Human-in-the-Loop (HIL) model
The HIL model was created in MATLAB© using the conceptual model produced from
the relationships noted in the correlation of coefficients and network graph and using
Heron's formula to determine the surface area of the triangles by using the value of the
edges. Heron's formula first determines the semi-perimeter, sp, using:

sp =

(a + b + c)
2

where: a = length of edge xi
b = length of edge X2
c = length of edge X3
and then computes the surface area of the triangle using the formula:

Surface Area = "V sp(sp - a)(sp - b)(s/? - c)
For Sample A, the edge lengths were computed by adding the value of the two end nodes
for each edge of the side of every triangle in the geometric shape. Because a side of one
triangle may also be the side of another triangle, a strong potential for duplicate values
being included in the computation exists. Additional code was added to the model to
compute only the edge lengths of the network diagram by summing the value of the
nodes for each edge across the network diagram.
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In testing Sample A's algorithm 48.6% of the test cases returned errors, shown in Figure
15 and Figure 16. Hypothesis testing for Sample A indicated 14% of the actual cases
evoked errors, as noted in Section 0. Therefore the process for Sample B only included
examining the sum of the edge lengths across the network by adding the value of the two
applicable nodes for each edge.
The sum of the individual surface area and the sum of the edge lengths, across the
network diagram were used as the final result of the model for Sample A. Code was
inserted to monitor when the triangle was incalculable because either it was opened by
stretching or so compressed that it had no surface area. In this instance, the value of zero
was returned to the summating equation and the error was counted. The error code was
used as numerable indicator to flag those instances where the value of the parameters
stressed the relationships inherent in the model. It provided an opportunity to visually
examine potential cause and effect relationships. The sum of the edge lengths across the
network diagram was used as the final result of the model for Sample B.
Testing of the HIL model was conducted per Section 3.5.5. Initial testing indicated that
calculations for surface area had an unacceptable number of errors. Given this concern,
the function for computing the volume of a polyhedron was not computed.

The

complexity of the solution space prohibited a test of the entire solution space by
increasing the value of each parameter from zero for increments of 0.05. The estimated
time to determine the surface area solution space, using the computing resources
available, exceeded one century.
3.5.5. Testing
The test plan, based on a white-box, waterfall philosophy, was developed to test all of the
functional, application performance and use requirements for academic testing of the
hypothesis(s) supporting this research.

Specific error handling was minimally

incorporated in the MATLAB© code and testing was not focused on user friendliness.
Testing of the MATLAB© environment was considered outside the scope of the test plan.
The primary purpose of the test plan was to ensure the application met the requirements
for supporting the determination if a relationship exists between the parameters of the
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risk equation and the geometric properties of the instantiation of the risk equation. The
application was not designed to be a simulation, but instead, to assist in understanding
and managing the risk of an underwater terrorism event. The secondary purpose of the
testing was to identify and expose all issues and associated risks with the hypothesis
evaluation, and to ensure they are appropriately resolved.

Performance was not

considered in the testing methodology. The requirements are given in Table 4, the
requirements traceability matrix.
Table 4: Requirements traceability matrix
Requirement

Function

Test case

1.0

Network
creation

Submit matrix to create
network of connections
with:

Determine the geometric characteristics from a
matrix.

2.0
Given a matrix of values that correspond to a
pre-coded polyhedron, determine the surface
area of all faces.

Heron's
formula

Nodes

Edges

2

1

3

2

3

3

4

3

4

4

4

5

4

6

Test using vectors:
0, 0,0
0 ,x, 0
0, 0, x
x, 0, x
X, X, X

Determine surface area
with x equal to .5 each
and 1.0 each. Then
test:
1, .7 .7
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Table 4: (Continued)
Requirement

Function

Test case

3.0

Sum of the
relations

Test using vectors:

Given a matrix of values that correspond to a
pre-coded polyhedron, determine the sum of
the edge lengths.

0, 0,0
0 ,x, 0
0, 0, x
x, 0, x
x, x, x
Determine surface area
with x equal to .5 each
and 1.0 each. Then
test:
1, .7 .7

4.0
Determine the values for 2.0 and 3.0 above for
the following cases:
All values set at the state of complete
uncertainty.

All parameters = 0.5

All values set at the state of complete
favorability to the defender.

All parameters = 0.0

All values set at the state of complete
favorability to the adversary

All parameters = 1.0

Values of key parameters set high and low

High parameters = 1.0.
Low parameters = 0.1
Other parameters = 0.5

3.5.6. Executable model
The executable model did not differ from the human-in-the-loop model substantially.
The only difference was how data were provided to the functions. In the human-in-theloop model, data were provided by a human and checked against the expected results
after each scenario. In the executable model data were submitted to the functions via a
script file.
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3.6. Phase 2: Experiment
Upon successful completion of the model's functional testing, script files were created
from the samples, which called the model's functions and returned both graphic and
numeric results. For Sample A, the results included data on the surface area and the sum
of the edges. After the post experiment analysis of Sample A, it was verified that the
surface area calculations contained too many errors. Therefore, the model was modified
for Sample B's experiment to return only data on the sum of the edges of the network.
After the modification the experiment continued the testing of the null hypothesis to wit,
that it is not possible to develop a model that facilitates understanding the risk scenario
based on the parameters observed from prior underwater terrorism incidents.
3.7. Phase 3: Post-experiment
The third phase of the research was the post-experiment phase, which analyzed the output
of the model and identified revisions to the process and functionality. The analysis phase
consisted of evaluating the network diagram, the overall range of possible values, the
range of returned values, the standard deviation of the sampled values, and the
proportionality of the returned results.

The expectation was that an improved

understanding of the nature of the relative risk among the samples would be evident. The
analysis also sought to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the sampling process, the
hypothesis testing, the model and any potential study bias to determine potential
improvements to the methodology.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH FINDINGS
The research findings start with items common to all the samples- the basis of the
parameter research and how to quantify qualitative variables. The section then progress
through Sample A and Sample B presenting the findings on the parameters, the
relationships between the parameters, test data for the model, the output from the
experiment and a brief analysis of the experiments data. Discussions of the impacts of
the analysis are included in Section 0.
4.1.

Expert opinion of parameters

The expert opinion solicitation conducted to evaluate the efficacy of the analytical
research conducted with Samples A and B are shown in Figure 9. The four experts
collectively represent 31 years of experience with a minimum experience base of 6 years
and an average of 7.75 years. For education, the respondents had an average of 1.4 years
of education with a maximum of 3.0 years and a minimum of 230.4 hours of classroom
time.
Figure 9 shows the importance on the Y-axis and Ease on the x-axis. For importance, a
five represents that the parameter is considered very important in determining risk or
threat while a value of one represent the parameter is not very important in determining
risk or threat. For ease, five represents the value of the parameter is very difficult to
obtain while one represents the value of the parameter is very easy to obtain. The
parameter key resource—people (k) and the dummy parameter finance (d) were indicated
as most important but difficult to obtain while the parameter unique environment (u) and
the dummy parameter population index (x) were indicated as least important although the
population index was noted as easily obtainable. All of the parameters derived from
answering Research Question One were rated at least a 2.5 on the 5.0 Likert scale
validating that the parameters utilized in the research have importance within the domains
of homeland security risk and homeland security threat analysis.
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4.2.

How to quantify qualitative variables

In answering Research Questions One and Two the parameter was both indicated and
related to another, or it was not. The research questions did not address the magnitude or
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Figure 9: Expert opinion of parameter importance and ease

value of the parameters. The concern is how to assign a quantitative value from a
qualitative estimate that may range across extreme values. Darby (2004) provided a basis
for the approach to solving this problem by using possibility theory, including a
discussion on fuzzy measures, which can range in value from 0 to 1.0. Willet (1901), in
discussing uncertainty as a probability, asserted that uncertainty is greatest when the
degree of probability for risk is equal to one half, or expressed as a decimal = 0.5.
Essentially, if there is absolutely no information about a given parameter either for or
against and adversarial position, the parameter is in its greatest state of uncertainty or
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valued at 0.5. If, however, information about the parameter indicates an absolute end
state, then the value is equal to 1.0, representing a 100 probability of occurrence, or 0.0,
representing no probability of occurrence.
However, as noted in the introduction, probability is not an acceptable means for
quantifying the qualitative data in many instances. Since each parameter is analyzed
under varying degrees of epistemic uncertainty and can range across a continuum of
uncertainty (from known to completely unknown) a spectrum is appropriate. Spectrums
are used in many domains (e.g., light, electromagnetic) and unify the end states.
Consider that each parameter is comprised of a large number of characteristics that are ndimensional. Algebraic theory has two theories to address the representation of an ndimensional object. In linear algebra, the spectral theorem for symmetric matrices allows
for diagonalization of a matrix that meets certain conditions. In algebraic topology, the
generalized cohomology theory facilitates studying the topology based upon its group
including n-dimensional closed cells. Both of these theories support using a spectrum as
a means to mathematically instantiate a parameter from

a vector or matrix of

characteristics but do not provide a methodology to map the qualitative value to a
quantitative result.
The intelligence community, drawing upon research on words of estimative probability
(see Kent, 1964, Kesselman, 2008, or Wheaton & Chido, 2008), uses the Estimative
language continuum, Figure 10, to map the qualitative judgments of their analysts to a
continuum. It avoids precise numerical ratings but reflects the intelligence community's
estimate of probability (National Intelligence Estimate, 2007).

Remote

Very
unlikely

Unlikely

Even
chance

Probably/
Likely

Very
likely

Figure 10: Estimative language continuum
(from National Intelligence Estimate, 2007)

Almost
certainty
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Applying Darby's (2004) application of fuzzy measures to Willet's (1901) description of
uncertainty yields a scale from zero to one that can then be placed over the Intelligence
community's estimative language continuum. With minor modification of the words on
the continuum, to encompass the vocabulary of uncertainty, a new spectrum, the Malice
Spectrum, is created. The Malice Spectrum, shown in Figure 11, allows analysts or
facility managers to map representative qualitative judgments to quantitative values.
Using the perspective of the defender, information from any source, permits the analyst
or facilities manager to develop a comparable estimate across diverse qualitative fields.
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certainty

0.0

Likely

Unlikely

0.25

Favorable to the Defender

Unknown

Unlikely

mi

Likely

Almost
certainty

Unfavorable to the Defender

Figure 11: Malice spectrum

The Malice Spectrum permits descriptive precision in evaluating parameters while
limiting the value of the parameters from the range zero to one, inclusive.
4.3.

Sample A

In conducting this research, 51 cases were selected based on the integrity of the sources
and the availability of multiple data sources as discussed in Sections 0 and 0. The cases
were randomly mixed and the first sample, called Sample A was drawn, consisting of 26
cases.
4.3.1. Parameters
Observing the first sample, Figure 12 graphically shows the descending progression of
percentage that each parameter was observed. Recall, the parameters were treated as
indicator random variables; therefore the mean represents the percentage that each
parameter was observed across the sample. Additionally, as indicator random variables,
the standard deviation for the parameters would be meaningless.
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Figure 12: Each parameter's occurrence in Sample A by percent
The first 11 parameters, consequence © through propaganda (p) are evident at least 80%
of the time.

The parameters consequence ©, operational planning (n), unique

environment (u) and vulnerability (v) were observed 100% of the time. Parameter
operational history (o) is also strong, being observed 56% of the time.

Although

parameters surveillance (s), movement of people (b), logistics (1), testing (e) and
information collection (f) are not significantly evident, parameters surveillance (s),
testing (e) and information collection (f) could be grouped together as probing.
Parameters movement of people (b) and logistics (1) were not directly observed or
reported significantly, with 8% observance for each.
4.3.2. Relationships
The results of the covariance tests, sorted according to parameter occurrence rate, are
provided in Table 5.
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Table 5: Covariance results for Sample A

0

0

Of the 272 possible covariance results, 158 (58%) are zero, 72 (26%) are positive and 42
(15%) are negative. Table 6 shows the matched pairs for the positive values from the
covariance analysis. In all cases, the relationship was bi-directional - either positive or
negative in both directions.
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Table 6: Positive values from covariance for Sample A
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Table 7 shows the matched pairs for the negative values from the covariance analysis.

Table 7: Negative values from covariance for Sample A
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By itself, given the parameters were treated as indicator random variables and the
information came from unclassified sources, which may not have all the pertinent
information known about the incident, this information provides no insight into the nature
of the relationships between the variables directly.
The Pearson's product-moment correlation of coefficients, presented by parameter
occurrence rate, for Sample A is shown in Table 8. The asterisks given for the values of
parameters consequence (c), pre-operational planning (n), unique environment (u) and
vulnerability (v) represent that they were observed in all instances and have a direct linear
relationship. Other than consequence, pre-operational planning, unique environment and
vulnerability, only three relationships have an absolute value greater than 0.7, explicitly
fg, fi, and gi, forming a triangular relationship. If the pairs with an absolute value of 0.69
were included (be, bf, bg, and bi) only the parameters movement of people (b) and testing
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(e) remain to be considered. By including absolute values equal to or greater than 0.5 the
pairs bp, ko, kt, tm, tr, li, Ig, and If are under consideration. Having no other contrary
indications and given the data was drawn from imprecise sources, the heuristic that
absolute value of r > 0.5 indicated a substantially strong linear relationship was accepted
for this research. Using r > 0.5, all of the parameters are under consideration for the
network graph.
Table 8: Results of correlation of covariance for Sample A

Notwithstanding the parameters consequence (c), operational planning (n), unique
environment (u) and vulnerability (v), which were observed in each case, 15 linear
relationships were observed between the 12 parameters that form 72 one-to-one
relationships between the parameters, and form 136 distinct triangles. A network graph,
per Section 0, was created to facilitate understanding of the nature of the relationships
and is shown in Figure 13. Each node represents a parameter. The edges indicate a
relationship between the parameters, although the length of the edge has no meaning - it
was determined by the software used to generate the figure.
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•r'v

Figure 13: Complete network graph for Sample A

Because of the parameters consequence (c), pre-operational planning (n), unique
environment (u) and vulnerability (v) having a one to one relationship with all the other
parameters, Figure 13 is difficult to observe the unique relationships. Therefore, Figure
14 is provided, which clearly indicates the smaller number of relationships without
consequence (c), pre-operational planning (n), unique environment (u) or vulnerability
(v) as super-nodes.
Using both the correlation of coefficients analysis and the network graph, a mathematical
model for the surface area of Sample A was created. Essentially, the surface area is the
sum of three individual summations: the triangles formed by seven unique relationships;
the sum of the triangles formed by pairs of the parameters consequence (c), pre
operational planning (n), unique environment (u) and vulnerability (v); and the sum of the
triangles formed by parameters c, n, u and v with the other parameters. This model can
be written as:
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(big+bif+bgf+igf+igl+gfl+ifl)
+
X

Y

I X(xyc)
1-x

X = (p, i, g, k, o, t, f, s, m, 1, b, r, e)
y = (n, u, v)

l-y

+
A

ZX

ZY

ZZ

£ [ £ abzx + £ abzy + £ abzz + apb +atr ]
,=a

,=zx

,=zy

,=zz

a = (c, n, u, v)
zx = (e,f,g,i)
zy = (f, i, 1)
zz = (i, 1)

Using this equation, Heron's formula can be applied to determine the surface area of the
triangles or the sum of the edges can be computed by adding the value of the parameters,
instantiated as nodes. Coding this equation into MATLAB °, per Section 0, a human in
the loop model can be created.
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Figure 14: Network graph of the unique relationships from Sample A

4.3.3. Sample A test results
Utilizing the test criteria given in Section 3.5.5, testing was satisfactorily conducted and
the results are shown in Table 9, Table 10, and because of its size, Appendix D.
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Table 9: Test requirement 1.0, create geometric characteristic from a matrix results
Test Protocol

Expected
Actual
Nodes Edges Nodes Edges
2
1
2
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
4
4
6
4
6

Remarks
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory

Table 10: Test requirement 2.0 and 3.0, given a matrix determine surface area and sum of
the edge lengths results
Test Protocol
2.0 Surface Area
Surface Area Expected

Surface Area Computed

0, 0,0

Error - no triangle formed

Error

0, .5, 0
0,0, -5
.5, 0, .5
•5, .5, .5
0,1,0
0, 0,1

Error - no triangle formed
Error - no triangle formed
Error - no triangle formed
.1083
Error - no triangle formed
Error - no triangle formed
Error - no triangle formed
.4330
.2449

Error
Error
Error
.1083
Error
Error
Error
.4330
.2449

Sum expected

Sum returned

1,0,1
1,1,1

1, -7, .7
3.0 Sum of Edges

0, 0,0
0, .5, 0
0, 0, .5
.5, 0, .5
•5, .5, .5
0,1,0
0,0,1

1,0,1
1,1,1

1, .7, .7

.5
.5
1.0

1.0

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0
1.0
2.0

1.0
2.0
3.0
2.4

3.0
2.4
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A graphic display of the results of the test conducted on Sample A, Figure 15, illustrates
the results for the surface area and edge length computations using the edges of the
triangles as the basis for the computations. Note that a scalar of 0.5 was used on the sum
of the edges and on the errors. The scalar was then applied again for the product of the
surface area and the sum of the edges. The scalar was used to facilitate study of the
relationships on one graph.
After the initial test of Sample A, the code was updated to compute the sum of the edges
based on the network diagram.

The results of the update are shown in Figure 16. Note

that a different scalar has been used to offset the sum of the edges with the surface area
for ease of comparison.
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Figure 15: Test results from Sample A - sum of the edges computed using triangles
formed.
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Figure 16: Test results from Sample A - sum of the edges computed from network
diagram.
4.4.

Results of experiment for Sample A

Sample A, consisting of 26 cases of underwater terrorism, was submitted to the geometric
structure generated by the parameters observed within the cases and the relationships
between those parameters are indicated by a correlation of coefficients analysis. Figure
17 shows the surface area and the sum of the edges for Sample A. A scalar of 0.05 was
applied to the results of the sum of the edges to facilitate plotting the surface area and the
sum of the edges on the same graph. The total number of errors generated by the surface
area calculations for this sample was 537 out of 3,770 calculations (14%). The least
number of errors for the surface area calculation for any one case in Sample A was 3
(2%) with a maximum number of errors for two different cases of47 (32%). In each case
in Sample A, there were errors in computing surface area.
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Figure 17: Sample A's surface area and sum of the edges results using the edges of the
triangles formed for computations.
Despite the known errors in the calculations using the triangle method, the surface area
and the sum of the edges illustrate a relationship for both sums of the edges. The
relationship can be seen in the scatter plot that maps the surface area to the X-axis and the
sum of the edges to the Y-axis, shown in Figure 18 and in Figure 19 that suggest a
positive correlation. Given the high incident of errors, this correlation was not researched
further.
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Surface Area
Figure 18: Sample A's sum of the edges and surface area using the triangles formed
method
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Figure 19: Sample A's surface area and sum of edges using the network method
For the sum of the edges in Sample A, the data did not exhibit integrity errors. Recall
that the range of the sum of the edges for the sample space ranges from 0 to a maximum
of 870 with absolute uncertainty at 435. The sample, n=26, had a maximum value of
679.8 and a minimum value of 560. The mean for the sample was 629.8 with a standard
deviation of 32.1. The results of Sample A's experiment are shown in Figure 20. The
difference from absolute uncertainty to the minimum value noted in Sample A is 125 and
the difference from the maximum value for any case in Sample A to the computed
maximum for Sample A was 190.2. The values for any case in Sample A are in a band
with width 119.8. 11 of the 26 (42%) of the cases were outside of the standard deviation
with seven below and four above.
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Figure 20: Sample A's sum of edges from the experiment

Figure 21 shows the sum of the edges using the network diagram. It also shows the
standard deviation of 6.6, the mean of 102.0 and is limited on the Y-axis by the point of
absolute uncertainty (all values set to 0.5) of 72 and the maximum value for the network
of 144. This sample had a minimum value of 89.2 and a maximum value of 112.7.
A discussion of Sample A can be found in Section 0.

84

Sample A: uncertainty to certainty wth Std Dev

115

~ 100

Figure 21: Sample A's sum of the edges using the network diagram

4.5.

Sample B

Sample B, the remaining 25 cases (see Section 0) of the original 51 accepted, was
analyzed and processed after making some changes to the methodology as previously
noted. The most important change was eliminating the calculations of the surface area
and using only the edges of the network diagram for the computation.
4.5.1. Parameters
Observing the second sample, Figure 22 graphically shows the descending progression of
percentage that each parameter was observed. Again, the parameters were treated as
indicator random variables; therefore the mean represents the percentage that each
parameter was observed across the sample. Additionally, as indicator random variables,
the standard deviation for the parameters would be meaningless.
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The first 10 parameters, unique environment (u) through key resources—people (k) are
evident at least 80% of the time. Only the parameter unique environment (u) is observed
100% of the time. The parameters operational history (o) and propaganda (p) are also
strong, being observed 72 % and 56% of the time, respectively. Again, the parameters
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Figure 22: Each parameter's occurrence in Sample B by percent
information collection (f), surveillance (s) and testing (e), which can be grouped together
as probing, have the lowest number of observations.
4.5.2. Relationships
The results of the covariance tests, sorted according to parameter occurrence rate, are
provided in Table 11. Of the 272 possible covariance results, 214 (79%) are positive, 50
(18%) are zero and 8 (3%) are negative. Table 12 shows the matched pairs for the
positive values from the covariance analysis. In all cases, the relationship was bi
directional - either positive or negative in both directions.
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Table 11: Covariance results for Sample B
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Table 12: Positive values from covariance for Sample B
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The matched pairs for the negative values from the covariance analysis are ke, oe, pb, and
bs.
By itself, given the parameters were treated as indicator random variables and that the
information came from unclassified sources, which may not have all the pertinent

87

information known about the incident; this information provides no insight into the nature
of the relationships between the variables directly.
The Pearson's product-moment correlation of coefficients, presented by parameter
occurrence rate, for Sample B is given in Table 13.
The asterisks given for the values of the parameter unique environment (u) represent that
it was observed in all instances and has a direct linear relationship. Four of the pairs, ig,
in, gn and vc have a linear relationship with a value of 1.0. 6 additional relationships
have an r value of greater than 0.7: ki, kg, kn, ko, tv and tc, tending to a strong
correlation with the parameter key resource - people (k).

The correlation between

tactics, techniques and procedures (t) continues into the correlation band of an r value
greater than 0.6, with ti, tg, tn, tr, mv and mc. The least valued accepted relationships,
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Table 13: Correlation of coefficients for Sample B
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those greater than 0.5, include op, oi, og, on, mi, mg, mn, mt, and fs. All correlations
above 0.5 total 25 pair-wise relationships focused on the parameters c, f, g, i, k, m, n, o,
p, r, s, t, u, and v.
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Sample B had 25 linear relationships between the parameters, not including unique
environment (u) that formed 23 unique triangles and one two-node spur. If unique
environment is added, an additional 25 triangles and two spurs are added to the geometric
shape - a total of 48 faces and 3 spurs. A network graph is shown in
Figure 23 that illustrates the network with all the parameters included. Figure 24 is a
network graph with the parameter unique environment (u) omitted.

Figure 23: Sample B network graph - all parameters
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Figure 24: Sample B network graph without the parameter unique environment (u)

4.5.3. Sample B test results
Without the surface area calculations as part of the function, the test parameters were
very similar, but omitted the requirement for surface area and surface area errors.
Utilizing the test criteria given in Section 3.5.5, except as noted, testing was satisfactorily
conducted and the results are shown in Table 14, Table 15 and Table 16.
Table 14: Test requirement 1.0, create geometric characteristic from a matrix results
Test Protocol

Expected
Nodes Edges
2
1
3
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
4
6
4

Actual
Nodes
2
3
3
4
4
4
4

Edges
1
2
3
3
4
5
6

Remarks
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory

Table 15: Test requirement 3.0, given a matrix determine the sum of the edge lengths
Test Protocol 3.0
Sum expected

Sum returned

0, 0,0

0

0

0, 0.5, 0
0, 0, 0.5
0.5, 0, 0.5
0.5, 0.5, 0.5
0, 1,0
0, 0,1
1,0,1
1, 1,1
1, .7, .7

0.5
.5
1.0
1.5
1.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
2.4

0.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
1.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
2.4

Table 16: Test requirements 4.0, using special cases for the test protocol
given in 3.0, determine the sum of the edges results
Test protocol: Sum of the edges
Low value test.
All parameters set to zero
High value test.
All parameters set to 1.0
Mid-range test.
All parameters set to 0.5
Anchor test - u low.
All parameters set to 0.5 except
« = 0.1
Anchor test - u high.
All parameters set to 0.5 except
u = 1.0
Unique test - / low.
All parameters set to 0.5 except
/ = 0.1
Unique test - / high.
All parameters set to 0.5 except
/= 1.0
Unique test -/low.
All parameters set to 0.5 except
f~ 0-1

Triangle method
Network method
Expected Actual Expected Actual
0
0
0
0
294.0

294.0

82.0

82.0

147.0

147.0

41.0

41.0

125.8

125.8

34.6

34.6

173.5

173.5

49.0

49.0

146.6

146.6

40.6

40.6

147.5

147.5

41.5

41.5

146.2

146.2

40.2

40.2
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Table 16: (Continued)
Test protocol: Sum of the edges
Unique test -/high.
All parameters set to 0.5 except
/= i.o
Unique test -1 low.
All parameters set to 0.5 except
f= 0.1
Unique test -1 high.
All parameters set to 0.5 except
t= 1.0
Test anchor & unique - low.
All parameters set to 0.5 except
t = 0.1 and b =1.0
Test anchor & unique - high.
All parameters set to 0.5 except
t = 1.0 and b =0.1

Triangle method
Network method
Expected Actual Expected Actual
148.0
148.0
42.0
42.0

134.2

134.2

37.8

37.8

163.0

163.0

45.0

45.0

134.7

134.7

38.3

38.3

162.6

162.6

44.6

44.6

A graphic display of the results of the test conducted on Sample B is shown in Figure 25.
Since surface area was not computed, no scalar was used in this graph.
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Figure 25: Test results from Sample B - triangle method
4.5.4. Results of experiment for Sample B
Sample B, consisting of 25 new cases of underwater terrorism, was submitted to the
geometric structure generated by the parameters observed within the cases and the
relationships between those parameters as indicated by a correlation of coefficients
analysis. Figure 26 shows the sum of the edges using the triangle edge method for
Sample B and Figure 27 shows the sum of the edges using the network method.
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Sample B: uncertainty to certainty with Std Dev
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Figure 26: Sample B experimentation results - sum of edges using triangle edge method
For the sum of the edges in Sample B, the data did not exhibit integrity errors. Recall
that the range of the sum of the edges for the sample space ranges from 0 to a maximum
of 294 with absolute uncertainty at 147. The sample, n=25, had a maximum value of
267.5 and a minimum value of 174.3. The mean for the sample was 228.7 with a
standard deviation of 25.0. The difference from absolute uncertainty to the minimum
value noted in Sample B is 27.3 and the difference from the maximum value for any case
in Sample B to the computed maximum for Sample B was 26.5. The values for any case
in Sample B are in a band with width 93.2. Nineteen of the 25 (76%) of the cases were
outside of the standard deviation with eight below and 11 above.
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Figure 27: Sample B's experimental results - sum of edges using network method

For the sum of the edges in Sample B, the data did not exhibit integrity errors. Recall
that the range of the sum of the edges for the sample space ranges from 0 to a maximum
of 82 with absolute uncertainty at 41. The sample, n=25, had a maximum value of 72.5
and a minimum value of 49.2. The mean for the sample was 63.2 with a standard
deviation of 6.4. The difference from absolute uncertainty to the minimum value noted in
Sample B is 8.2 and the difference from the maximum value for any case in Sample B to
the computed maximum for Sample B was 9.5. The values for any case in Sample B are
in a band with width 23.3. Nineteen of the 25 (76%) cases were outside of the standard
deviation with eight below and 11 above. A discussion of Sample B can be found in
Section 0.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This Chapter provides a discussion of the research findings following the order of the
research questions. It then discusses a comparison of the two samples and examines their
relationship based on the hypothesis testing. It concludes with suggestions for future
research.
5.1.

Discussion

This research contributed to a better understanding and management of several key areas
to the risk of underwater terrorism. First, it substantiated that the current parameters used
by many practitioners in the risk and intelligence community are applicable. It
demonstrated that conceptually the relationship between the parameters can be
determined through analytics. It established the Malice Spectrum as a tool to instantiate
the values of the parameters independent from the process of the value-determination.
Finally, it demonstrated the proof of concept that risk can be better understood and
managed - potentially even simulated - using the geometric characteristics of the
network graph of the R=TVC equation. Weaknesses in this research that directly
contribute to the applicability of this research exist - specifically the use of unclassified
data may have reduced the granularity of the samples potentially impacting the robust
analysis of the final geometric structure based on the relationships of the risk equation.
Each of these points is articulated in detail, below.
5.1.1. Parameters
The research indicates that the parameters utilized for this study, those currently used by
many facets of both the risk and the intelligence communities, are pertinent and
appropriate for understanding the risk equation. Given that the equation, R=TVC was
only parsed for the threat element; and that each case obtained for this data samples was
intentionally an underwater incident; and that each case was, at least, a small success
from the adversaries point of view, withdrawing vulnerability, consequence and unique
environment from the discussion is warranted. The research design was biased towards
those parameters. What was intriguing is that Sample B did not have a 100% correlation
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with vulnerability and consequence, although they were noted in each case. Given that
the purpose of an adversary is to exploit vulnerability to cause consequence, this lack of
correlation remains unexplained.
Both samples had the same parameters in the set of strongly evident parameters. In this
context, evident is defined as the number of cases in which the parameter was observed
across the sample. For both samples, the set of strongly evident parameters included
stated goals, adversarial ideology, key resource - material and pre-operational planning.
For parameters key resource - material and pre-operational planning, the strong
correlation was driven by the uniqueness of the underwater environment. The special
planning and movement of trained people to operate in the environment was often noted
in either the databases or in the media. For the parameters stated goals and adversarial
ideology, since each case was after the fact either a complete success or a partial success,
the goals were known - usually by statement from the adversaries and the actual
adversary, with the applicable ideology, was known. In a pre-event risk analysis, this
information may be more difficult to discover.
For the weakly evident parameters, again, both samples had a similar set that included
movement of people, testing, information collection and logistics.

The parameters

testing, information collection and surveillance can be (and has been done so by the
intelligence or risk communities) grouped together as probing. The lack of probing noted
within the cases does not indicate that probing did not occur but can be accounted for
because either it was not recorded in the databases explicitly, it was not exciting enough
to be included in the media or, if noticed, may have thwarted the attack and would
therefore not have allowed the event to occur. The potential to thwart an attack by
knowledge of the attack is especially true of testing. The data do not clarify if testing is
being actively conducted by adversaries or if the testing that was conducted resulted in
the adversaries being thwarted by law enforcement or the defender. The parameters
movement of people and logistics were not usually discussed in the databases or the
media sources. Several reasons may account for the omission of movement of people or
logistics, ranging from the information was not available to the authors or database
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managers; the information may not make exciting reading; or the information may be of
such a classified nature that it was not revealed in the open sources available.
The expert solicitation validated that observing only unclassified information may have
skewed the results. Specifically, finance (d) was considered to be one of the two most
important variables. In discussing finance with the experts, they agreed that without
finance, the adversarial organization would be unsuccessful.

However, obtaining

unclassified information about finance was, at best, difficult and there was not enough
information available to ensure the data collected were accurate. The other dummy
parameters, population index (x), criticality (y) and leadership (a) were within the
expected areas on the scatter plot. Essentially, population index and criticality are
element of the consequence parameter and should be evaluated in future research.
Leadership, for any rational organization, is a significant parameter for analyzing the
organization but frequently does not indicate the overall risk. Both leadership and
finance are leading measures that impact other parameters. Leadership impacts ideology,
stated goals and propaganda. Finance impacts key resource material, movement of
people, logistics and potential key resource - people. The unclassified data did not
provide granularity to evaluate these parameters in this research.
One parameter that was added and did not appear to be important to the experts is the
unique environment. The underwater environment, although mentioned, has not received
significant treatment in the literature. This environment is a difficult area to attack in or
defend because of the limited visibility, magnetic anomalies, sea floor debris, harsh
operating conditions, extraneous noise and the special training and equipment needed
(Dobkowski, 2007; Sakhuja, 2005). The analysis, biased as it was towards the unique
environment, validates to veracity that the unique environment, when it exists, must be
considered. The necessity to protect material and people from water, salty or otherwise,
incurs a liability on the defender to protect critical infrastructure and a liability on the
adversary to mount a successful attack because of the special preparations and
opportunity for detection as material, probing and training is conducted. To this point,
the unique environment has been a favorable factor for the defender. However, given the
hardening of other targets, this benefit may become a liability.
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5.1.2. Relationships
The research demonstrated that the relationships of the risk equation can be determined
through analytics. Examining the parameters with the highest number of correlations,
Sample A's set was pre-operational planning, unique environment, vulnerability,
consequence, movement of people, information collection, stated goals and adversarial
ideology.

Sample B's set was unique environment, stated goals, adversarial ideology,

key resources - material, pre-operational planning and tactics, techniques and procedures.
The parameter unique environment is inherent in the data since the data collection was
biased towards only those cases in the underwater environment. Parameters stated goals,
adversarial ideology and pre-operational planning are common to the sets and explained
by the same effect as unique environment. Key resources - material is an intriguing
parameter. For Sample A it had a low number of correlations and in Sample B it was
correlated seven times - one of the highest number of correlations. A review of the
specific cases indicates the disparity in correlations may be caused by the actual location
where each case occurred. In the first sample, most of the cases occurred in ports where
the adversaries lived or operated. For Sample B, most of the attacks took place where the
adversaries had to move to.
The parameters with the lowest number of correlations for Sample A were testing, key
resources—people, key resources - material, operational history, propaganda, training
and surveillance. For Sample B, they were movement of people, testing, information
collection, logistics, propaganda, training and surveillance.

The parameters testing,

propaganda, surveillance and training are common to both samples.

Interestingly

parameters movement of people, information collection and key resource - people are in
the lowest number of correlations for one sample, but the highest number of correlations
for the other sample. The disparity in correlation is attributed to the small sample sizes.
It's expected that an aggregated analysis of the samples would resolve this disparity. The
low correlation for both testing and surveillance is not surprising, for the same reason
noted in Section 0. The low number of correlations for propaganda is contraindicated.
Propaganda did not appear to follow ideology and goals as strongly correlated. The
contradiction is a weakness in the research design - the data for ideology and goals were
recorded in the databases or the media, but the source of that information (propaganda?
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Intelligence?) was not available. The low number of correlations for training is not
expected. Training was noted in a majority of the cases and is inherent in an attack in
any unique environment. Training was assumed to have a linear relationship with the
other parameters, specifically supporting exploiting a vulnerability to obtain a
consequence. This exception to what was expected indicates the potential utility for this
research - training was related to tactics, techniques and procedures for both samples. It
verifies the veracity of the parameter relationships; in this case, that training can be used
to indicate what tactics, techniques or procedures that an adversary may be planning to
use.
Although Sample A had a larger sample size and larger diversity in cases, Sample B,
which included a number of cases with Shayetet 13 or the Sea Shepherd Society as the
adversary, had a more robust basis of verifiable information available.

Potentially,

Sample B is a better representation of what can be known about an organization.
Using the specific information from the analysis and applying critical thinking based
upon studying each case, the known perpetrators and the tactics used, relationships are
apparent that may not directly correlate to the analysis. Propaganda appears to assert an
adversarial ideology and clarify the stated goals of the organization. Indications that
propaganda history provides support for the accumulations of both key resources: people
and material were observed. An adversarial ideology elicits tactical stated goals and
indicates a desire for strategic consequence, whereas the stated goals pursue tactical
consequences as a means to obtain strategic objectives.
People are vital to any organization. In an adversarial organization, people enable the
employment of tactics, techniques and procedures and utilize the other key resource,
materials, to exploit vulnerabilities. They are also required to conduct pre-operational
planning. Pre-operational planning determines or modifies the tactics, techniques and
procedures used. It also determines the required training, coordinates movement and
logistics, and acquires the material key resources. Training, of course, prepares people
for the operation.
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As with any organization, an adversary learns from their past successes and mistakes
through their operational history. An adversary's operational history enables effective
propaganda and informs their pre-operational planning. Operational history can also be
used as an indicator of tactics, techniques and procedures and informs the information
collections efforts of the adversary. The key to understanding the operational history of
an adversary is understanding the adversary's tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP).
TTP exploits vulnerabilities to accomplish the organization's stated goals.
Reviewing the cases, there were incidents where only one form of probing was evident.
Without explicitly looking for one of the three element of probing - information
collection, surveillance or testing, the signs may be lost, or the relationship each has with
other parameters may be understated. This research suggests that each parameter should
be viewed independently. Information collection seeks consequences be determining,
vulnerabilities and informing the pre-operational planning.

Surveillance modifies an

adversary's pre-operational planning by influencing the design of testing and confirming
the expected vulnerabilities. Testing, which usually occurs later in the planning cycle,
reconciles the pre-operational planning and validates vulnerabilities that exist for the
adversary to exploit.
A successful attack cannot occur without the materials used in the attack (e.g. special
equipment for underwater operations, explosives). Materials are what enable tactics,
techniques and procedures, act upon the vulnerabilities of the defender and are used for
training the people. The materials must be moved for training, assembly or for the attack
via logistics. Besides moving the material, the people involved in the attack must be
moved. Movement positions people for training, surveillance, and testing.
The unique environment of underwater operations introduces complexities with must be
managed and accounted for. For this research, the unique environment accounted for the
setting or conditions in which the attack was conducted. The underwater environment is
unlike anything else on Earth and changes drastically from target location to target
location. Operating within the confines of a heavily trafficked, cold, noisy harbor
(Boston) is dramatically different from a low traffic, warm water, quiet approach to
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remote infrastructure (the Florida Keys).

The unique environment requires special

training and materials. Because of the interaction with the environment (water flow), this
unique environment increases the consequence of the attack. Given the restricted
visibility and difficulty in securing undersea boundaries, the unique environment impacts
vulnerability, the ability to conduct pre-operational surveillance and the ability to execute
testing. The unique environment parameter can be generalized beyond the underwater
environment paradigm to include other unique environment like polar operations, nonpressurized airborne attacks or sub terrarium attacks.
5.1.3. Malice spectrum
This research established the basis of the malice spectrum which instantiates the values
for the parameters independent of the methods utilized to obtain those values (see Gay &
Hester, 2012). Utilizing the malice spectrum provides a common scale for diverse
parameters and eliminates the units of measure. Although the accuracy of determining
the value of any parameter is minimal, the malice spectrum provides a level of precision
that permits discrimination between cases. The analyst can add another digit to any
number to increase the value over similar cases. For example, if an analyst believes three
organizations have strong but similar adversarial ideologies, the analyst can assign all
three a value of 0.7 or discriminate by assigning 0.7, 0.71 and 0.72 if there was some
compelling reason to elevate one over another. Another strength of the malice spectrum
is the ability to assign a value to a parameter that is independent of the method used to
determine the parameter's score. The malice spectrum directly addresses one of the
concerns noted in the introduction - that current methods force the analyst to use either
statistical methods or expert opinion. Using the malice spectrum permits any method to
be used and the results to be applied directly. The malice spectrum is also already
aligned with the linguistic ambiguity inherent in the risk equation and is very similar to a
model that is widely accepted by the intelligence community.
Conversely, the malice spectrum has two detractors. First, the malice spectrum is a
subjective, vice objective, knowledge system.

Instantiating the number may be

influenced by personal interpretations or prejudice. The first detractor leads to the second
detractor, the ability to obtain repeatability across diverse analysts.

The lack of
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repeatability may be mitigated by the use of job aids or training when used in a practical
setting. However, enhancing repeatability through job aids or training may hamper the
effectiveness of the malice spectrum, reducing the ability for the analyst to apply critical
thinking in an individual, subjective evaluation.
5.1.4. Measure of risk
Research Question Four was "What is the measure of risk?" to ensure the final value had
meaning to the analyst and the policy maker. The original research indicated risk would
be a measure of either volume or surface area. However, the final results indicate that
risk can be measured as a sum of the edges between the nodes in the geometric
representation of the risk equation, essentially acting as a proxy for the volume or surface
area. By using the malice spectrum, the number derived from the computations became
dimensionless - regardless of the geometric formula used.

The final result of any

comparison between cases was just a number based on length of every individual edge
that ranged in size from zero to two. In describing the final result, the use of the term
relative risk is appropriate since the final comparison between any two, or more, cases is
just comparison of a series of numbers that indicate the greater likelihood of an
unfavorable occurrence.
5.2.

Objective utility

Can the risk of an underwater terrorism event be understood and managed using this
process? Unequivocally yes. With known cases entered according to ascending order of
known values of the parameters, the output demonstrated an expected increase in value
based on the relationships of the parameters. More importantly, an understanding of the
nature and critical path of the risk equation is emerging from this unclassified, open
source, sampling.
Using the surface area or the volume of the geometric shape to determine the final values
of the relative risk of each case was not demonstrated, and in fact, was shown to be
contraindicated because the triangles which form the surface areas tend to collapse or tear
apart as the values of the parameters change from complete uncertainty. However, the
value of the sum of the edges from the geometric shape created in a network diagram was

103

shown to be an effective calculation at least twice. In both samples the sum of the edges
were shown to occupy a band well into the unfavorable solution space and the band was
at least 18% into the unfavorable area. The band does not represent an absolute threshold
of a pending event, but does indicate that a potential threshold could be calculated based
on data from unsuccessful cases.
The variations in the output, the spikes and dips when the input was provide in ascending
order, frequently occur where the value of the input is consistent, as shown in Figure 28.
The variations are caused by the interaction of the parameters across the relationships and
provide a suggestion for a critical path to reduce overall risk through investment. If
knowledge of the variations actually reduces the risk, or just reduces the numerical
calculation, can only be determined by experts in the risk field.
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Figure 28: Comparison of Sample B's raw data to calculated relative risk
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In the post analysis the data looked similar but was from two different models. Would
the output from one sample on another sample's model be similar? Although not part of
the original analysis, the research would not be complete without answering that
question. Therefore the data for Sample B were submitted to the model created by
Sample A for the sum of the edges computed by the edges of the triangles and by the
edges from the network diagram. The data for Sample B were then plotted against the
output from the Sample B model and is shown in Figure 29. Although the values from
the Sample A model had to be scaled to plot with the results of the Sample B model, the
similarity, despite the differing model and method is plainly evident. That different
networks give the same relative risk solution is not surprising, since the data were linear.
It does, however, indicate the processes are comparable and that the least complex
solution space - the sum of the edges from the network diagram - is value added.
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5.3.

Future research

Several areas for future research exist, mostly focused around the limitations already
noted throughout this paper. Although obtaining declassified abstracts of classified
databases may answer many of the concerns noted, true research with classified data is
required to create the most comprehensive analysis of the parameters and their
relationships and to establish a true threshold of concern for an event horizon. The
classified data may also provide insight into the temporal relationships between the
parameters and facilitate development of more robust predictive tools. Once the temporal
relationships are mapped, an analysis of how the values of the parameters changed over
time may indicate a better measure of risk as in incorporates the temporal dimension of
the risk equation, which heretofore has been ignored.
Another area for research is consideration of combining information collection, pre
operational surveillance and testing into one parameter, perhaps called "probing". What
would aggregation of these parameters do to the analysis of overall risk?

Would

aggregation impact intelligence analysis, risk analysis or have no impact?
The standardization of the process to determine the values of each parameter will require
cross discipline research between the intelligence, security and insurance communities to
develop a linguistic-based membership set which appropriately corresponds the
qualitative values from the respective communities to the malice spectrum. Another
concern is math doesn't take into account the linguistic spin of an evaluation. Can the
integration of the mathematical analysis of the parameters with a linguistic analysis be
improved? Finally, with the parameters, should any parameter be weighted?
The original vision of this research was that risk was a complex calculation similar to the
volume of an icosidodecahedron, also called a Hoberman sphere, increasing as the
distance between the nodes increased. Although the ability to maintain this complex
concept was lost to the inability to determine an accurate geometric area, the question and
vision remain. Perhaps the surface area should be based on the sum of multiple spheres
with the radius of each sphere equal to one or more nodes?
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The creation of a new model for each sample drawn, although relatively equivocal, does
not facilitate communication across risk communities. Therefore, a detailed analysis of
the combined analytics and linguistics to develop one model that will be used across the
domains is required.
As Tolk (2012) noted, successful modeling and simulation requires the model to be
conceptually valid, technically mature and applicable to the user; to wit, operationally
applicable. This methodology, including the Malice Spectrum, has been demonstrated
within this thesis to be conceptually valid and operationally applicable. However, there
are several areas of technical immaturity which must be researched before utilizing the
methodology in a real-time engagement. This includes connectivity to intelligence fusion
networks for the collection of formatted data, integration of a data warehousing process
to provide a continuous confidence level of the data and development of the process to
nest (link together) various scenarios. The development of an automated algorithm to
implement the Malice Spectrum that combines new input from intelligence Fusion
Centers with historic trends, and expert opinion previously stored would reduce the
processing time and provide a means for immediately evaluating the impact of
adversarial actions on the current measured risk level. Further research into a what-if
module would fully implement the system as a usable decision support system,
comparable to the requirements enumerated and motivated in Tolk (2009) and will
continue to improve the ability to manage and understand the risk of underwater
terrorism.
5.4.

Contribution

This research sought to improve the ability to manage and understand the risk of
underwater terrorism by creating a model based on the relationships of the parameters in
the risk equation. The research inductively examined available data to develop and
analyze a list of parameters and relationships, which was used to deductively create a
multi-perspective model of the risk equation. It identified parameters that provide a
multi-perspective view of the underwater terrorism incident and identified the
relationships between those parameters. The research developed and tested a method to
quantify the qualitative variables pertinent to the underwater terrorism threat and
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successfully evaluated 51 cases of underwater terrorism, developing a relative risk picture
across two samples.
It explored the feasibility of using the geometric shape generated by the network graph to
determine the surface area as a measure of relative risk and found that to be unrealistic
because of the numerous errors in the calculations as the parameters of the risk equation
changed.
This research introduced the malice spectrum as a tool to remove dimensions and
disaggregate the determination process from the final value used to instantiate the values
of the nodes in the network diagram.
The research explored the concept of using the surface area or the volume of the
geometric shape to determine the relative risk between cases but was unable to determine
an appropriate method to keep the edges from pulling apart or collapsing on itself when
treating the risk equation as a geometric face. It then determined the sum of the edges of
the network diagram to determine relative risk between 51 cases across two samples. It
showed that this method was an effective way to understand the underlying structure of
the risk of underwater terrorism and provided a framework to manage that risk.
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APPENDIX A
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Concept

Variable

Operational definition

Risk

R

R = Threat * Vulnerability * Consequence

Threat

T

T = Intent * Capability * Activity

Intent

I

Capability

C

Activity

A

I = Propaganda * Stated Intention * Adversarial
ideology
C = Tactics, techniques & procedure * Operational
history * key resources (people) * key resources
(material)
A = Logistics * Movement of people * Surveillance
* Information collection * Testing

Propaganda

P

Adversarial
ideology

i

Stated goals

g

Key resource people

k

Pre-operational
planning

n

The process of developing plans to achieve an
operational goal.

Operational
history

o

The past operations conducted by the adversary.

Tactics, techniques
and procedures

t

People working together in non-prescriptive methods
or by following common methodologies.

Pre-operational
surveillance

s

Observing a target to determine strengths, weaknesses
and forces available.

Key resources material

m

The acquisition of supplies necessary to conduct
operations.

Logistics

1

The movement of material.

Movement of
people

b

The change of physical location of people to
accomplish tasks.

Propagating ideas and/or information for the purpose
of assisting the adversary's cause or to damage the
defender's cause
The beliefs that guide a group in opposition to the
Defender's ideology or values
The explicitly declared results desired that the
adversary is working towards.
The people directly involved in conducting the attack,
including those that build and those that deploy the
weapon.
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Training

r

Any intervention meant to teach a person a particular
skill or behavior related to adversarial conduct.

Unique
environment

u

The setting or conditions in which the attack will be
conducted in or access to the Defender through.

Testing

e

Adversarial actions intend to provoke an observable
response to an aggressive stimulus.

Information
collection

f

Collecting information on a person or facility to assist
in preoperational planning.

Vulnerability

V

Consequence

c

"The set of critical infrastructure-specific
opportunities available for an adversary to exploit in
conducting operations, including reconnaissance and
operational attacks" (Gay & Hester, 2010).
"The total subjective value of damage inflicted as
the result of an attack on critical infrastructure"
(Gay & Hester, 2010)
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APPENDIX B
DATA COLLECTION PLAN

Justification
The purpose of this data collection is to determine what the parameters of an underwater
terrorism incident are as an initial effort to manage and understand the risk of underwater
terrorism. At the end of this collection process the answer to the first research question
(What are the parameters of an underwater terrorism incident?) should be answered.
Data Collection Process
Initial data will be obtained, utilizing keywords, from unclassified government or
educational databases available on the internet. That data will form a basis for collecting
additional open source data from the internet. Open source data will require at least two
independent sources to be considered valid. Additional details may require the use of
interviews with analysts having access to classified data to obtain unclassified amplifying
information.
Key words:
underwater
marine
limpet

undersea
maritime
UWIED

submerged
aquatic

submarine
diver

Detailed procedure for database search:
•

Identify trusted data source.

• Using individual key words, search data base.
•

Download obtained data, preferably in Excel format, to home directory.

•

Each successful search will be documented with the database name, date searched
and key words used.

•

Each successful search will be saved as a separate file using the naming
convention: databasename_keyword(date).xls.
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• Note information in the Data Collection Log.
• Copies of the files will be stored at two different locations (personal and work
computers).
Detailed procedure for open source search:
•

Using the initial parameters collected above, search for applicable open source
records.

•

Identify trusted data sources from the returned search items.

• Save applicable files to the home directory. Save in .pdf format using the author's
last name as the file name.
•

Note information in the Data Collection Log.

• Copies of the files will be stored at two different locations (personal and work
computers).
Privacy Protection
Not applicable. No personally protected or classified data is expected to be collected.
Records Management
As noted above.
Storage & Destruction
All the data files will be saved to a CD and filed with the dissertation at Old Dominion
University.
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APPENDIX C
DATA COLLECTION LOG EXAMPLE
Source Name: Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS)
Source Type: Open source & unclassified; 2004 - 2009; Domestic & international
Date Searched: Aug 12, 2011 @ 1600
Search Term
Underwater
Undersea
Submerged
Submarine
Marine
Maritime
Aquatic
Diver

Total hits
0
0
0

Limpet
UWIED

0
7

0
0
6
0
1787

Usable hits

0
Exported, suspect nothing relative
in collected.
0

All appeared to be LED not
UWIED

Files created: One spreadsheet made: WITS_Diver_AUG12.
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APPENDIX D
TEST RESULTS FROM SAMPLE A

Test
Protocol
Low value
test.
All
parameters
set to zero
High value
test.
All
parameters
set to 1.0
Mid-range
test.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
Anchor
test - n
low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
n = 0.1
Anchor
test - n
high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
n= 1.0

Expected
Surface Edge
Network Surface
Area
Length
Edge
Area
by
Length
Triangle

0

0

Actual
Edge
Network Remarks
Length Edge
Length

0

0

0

0

144

62.7868

870

144

72

15.6967

435

72

Expected
145 calls to
surfarea(),
145 surface
errors
returned, as
expected.

n=u=v =c

65.6

80.0

11.0275

9.6345

390.2

491.0

65.6

80.0

Area
decreases
because the
triangle gets
smaller as n
increases
until the two
0.5 sides are
compressed
against the
third side.
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Test
Protocol
Anchor
test-w
low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
u = 0.1
Anchor
test -u
high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
u = 1.0

Anchor
test - v
low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
v = 0.1
Anchor
test - v
high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
v = 1.0

Expected
Surface Edge
Network Surface
Length
Area
Edge
Area
by
Length
Triangle

Actual
Edge
Network Remarks
Length Edge
Length
n=u =v=c

65.0

11.0275

390.2

65.0

80.0

9.6345

491.0

80.0

65.6

11.0275

390.2

65.6

80.0

9.6345

491.0

80.0

Area
decreases
because the
triangle gets
smaller as n
increases
until the two
0.5 sides are
compressed
against the
third side.
n=u=v=c

Area
decreases
because the
triangle gets
smaller as n
increases
until the two
0.5 sides are
compressed
against the
third side.
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Test
Protocol
Anchor
test - c
low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
c = 0.1
Anchor
test - c
high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
c = 1.0

Unique
test - b
low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
6 = 0.1
Unique
test - b
high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
b= 1.0

Expected
Surface Edge
Network Surface
Area
Length
Area
Edge
by
Length
Triangle

Actual
Edge
Network Remarks
Length Edge
Length
n=u=v =c

65.6

11.0275

390.2

65.6

80.0

9.6345

491.0

80.0

68.4

13.2787

411.8

68.4

Area
decreases
because the
triangle gets
smaller as n
increases
until the two
0.5 sides are
compressed
against the
third side.
Unique.

29 surface
errors.
76.5

12.5574

464.0

76.5
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Test
Protocol
Unique test
- e low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
e = 0.1
Unique test
- e high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
e = 1.0
Unique test
-/low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except

Expected
Surface Edge
Network
Area
Length
Edge
by
Length
Triangle

Surface
Area

Actual
Edge
Network
Length Edge
Length

Remarks

e=k=
m=p=r
70.0

14.8629

427

70.0

10
surface
errors.
74.5

14.6142

445

74.5

f=g=i

68.8

13.4455

413.4

68.8

/= o.i
Unique test
-/high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
/= 1-0
Unique test
- g low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
s = 0.1

27
surface
errors.
76.0

12.7739

462.0

76.0

f=g=i

68.8

13.4455

413.4

68.8
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Test
Protocol
Unique test
-ghigh.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
*-1.0
Unique test
- i low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
i = 0.1
Unique test
- i high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
i=1.0
Unique test
- k low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
k = 0.1
Unique test
- k high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
k= 1.0

Expected
Surface Edge
Network
Area
Length
Edge
by
Length
Triangle

Surface
Area

Actual
Edge
Network
Length Edge
Length

Remarks

27
surface
errors.
76.0

12.7739

462.0

76.0

f=g=i

68.8

13.4455

413.4

68.8

27
surface
errors.
76.0

12.7739

462.0

76.0

e=k=
m=p=r
70.0

14.8629

427

70.0

10
surface
errors.
74.5

14.6142

445

74.5
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Test
Protocol
Unique test
-1 low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
/ = 0.1
Unique test
- / high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
/= 1.0
Unique test
- m low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
m = 0.1
Unique test
- m high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
m= 1.0
Unique test
- o low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
o - 0.1

Expected
Surface Edge
Network
Length
Edge
Area
by
Length
Triangle

Surface
Area

Actual
Edge
Network
Length Edge
Length

Remarks

Unique.
69.2

13.9458

418.2

69.2

21
surface
errors.
75.5

13.4234

456.0

75.5

e=k=
m= p=r
70.0

14.8629

427

70.0

10
surface
errors.
74.5

14.6142

445

74.5

o=s

70.4

15.1964

430.2

70.4

133

Test
Protocol
Unique test
- o high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
o= 1.0
Unique test
-p low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
p = 0.1
Unique test
-p high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
p= 1.0
Unique test
- r low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
r = 0.1
Unique test
- r high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
r = 1.0

Expected
Surface Edge
Network
Area
Length
Edge
by
Length
Triangle

Surface
Area

Actual
Edge
Network
Length Edge
Length

Remarks

6 surface
errors.
74.0

15.0472

441.0

74.0

e=k=
m=p =r
70.0

14.8629

427

70.0

10
surface
errors.
74.5

14.6142

445

74.5

e=k=
m=p=r
70.0

14.8629

427

70.0

10
surface
errors.
74.5

14.6142

445

74.5
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Test
Protocol
Unique test
- j low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
5 = 0.1
Unique test
- s high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
5=1.0
Unique test
-1 low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
* = 0.1
Unique test
-1 high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
/= 1.0
Test anchor
& unique low.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
n = 0.1 and
p=1.0

Expected
Surface Edge
Network
Length
Edge
Area
by
Length
Triangle

Surface
Area

Actual
Edge
Network
Length Edge
Length

Remarks

o=s

70.4

15.1964

430.2

70.4

6 surface
errors.
74.0

15.0472

441.0

74.0

Unique.
69.2

14.1959

420.6

69.2

18
surface
errors.
75.5

13.7482

453.0

75.5

10
surface
errors.
68.1

10.2785

400.2

68.1
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Test
Protocol
Test anchor
& unique high.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
except
n= 1.0 and
p =0.1
Vector too
long test.
Send vector
of length
18.
All
parameters
set to 0.5
Vector too
short test.
Send vector
of length
16.
All
parameters
set to 0.5

Expected
Surface Edge
Network
Area
Length
Edge
by
Length
Triangle

Actual
Surface Edge
Network
Area
Length Edge
Length

Remarks

56
surface
errors.
78.0

9.1343

483.0

MATLAB internal
error handling.

As expected.

MATLAB internal
error handling.

As expected.

78.0
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